Як організація українців Vitsche Berlin бореться з російською пропагандою в Німеччині

In January, another group assembled by Russian special services was discovered in Poland. It attempted to influence Polish elections by spreading disinformation. However, Moscow exerts its influence over European countries not only through such tools. As a result, pro-Russian sentiments in Europe are strengthening, and far-right political parties are gaining increasingly strong positions.

German politician («Alliance 90/The Greens»), MEP (2004-2019) and Vice Chair of the Supervisory Board of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom, Rebecca Harms, gave an exclusive interview to Sestry, discussing the biggest challenges the EU faces due to Russia’s actions and whether Europe is doing enough to counter them.

Russia’s Influence in Europe

‍Maryna Stepanenko: In June, the EU banned European political parties, think tanks and other organisations from receiving funding from Russia. However, are there loopholes that still allow Moscow to extend its influence over European countries?

Rebecca Harms: We have a new example based on an investigation by German journalists and disinformation experts. We know that since November 2024, a systematic campaign against German politicians has been underway. It is linked to the Russian troll factory once run by the late Yevgeny Prigozhin. Investigators discovered that more than 100 fake websites had been created to conduct campaigns against Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck and Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, spreading grotesque and false information about them.

I believe something similar has been happening in most EU member states, ever since Russia decided to launch an information war and support anti-democratic and pro-Kremlin parties across the European Union

Russia is actively trying to influence countries such as Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova and Serbia through economic, political and military pressure. Why is it important for them to maintain a European orientation? How can Germany and the EU strengthen their support for these countries to achieve this goal?

We do not have a magic toolkit for these countries, but much depends on whether there is a critical mass of citizens and politicians within them who can resist. Take Armenia, for example. Pro-Kremlin and authoritarian leaders lost the elections, allowing Pashinyan and his government to come to power. This demonstrates a certain resilience, and the European Union should support it, including by keeping the prospect of Armenia’s EU membership open.

You also mentioned Moldova. Partly thanks to Ukraine’s efforts, it has not only gained the prospect of EU membership but will soon begin accession negotiations. In some cases, external support matters. However, in Georgia, challenges have increased following recent elections. Nevertheless, the European Union continues to use democratic and legal mechanisms to encourage Tbilisi to return to democratic governance.

The rise of far-right sentiments in many European countries is often accompanied by pro-Russian rhetoric. How seriously does this threaten European unity and what actions can effectively counter these trends?

The European Union cannot win this battle against Russia alone.

Resilience is needed, and at times - resistance both in EU member states and in countries under pressure. At the same time, the EU can provide crucial support

We see this happening now, as the EU increases its involvement in the Balkans, as well as in Georgia and Moldova. Unfortunately, in Georgia, the EU took too long to respond adequately to the shifting priorities of the ruling party, which is controlled by a Georgian oligarch. At the same time, President Salome Zourabichvili, whom I greatly respect, also took quite some time to take a clear stance against the government.

The EU has tools to ensure fair elections, monitor voting processes and respond to cases of election fraud. We also have mechanisms to promote media freedom, institutional independence and the rule of law. These tools are stronger within the EU, but citizens of countries under Russian pressure are increasingly recognising their importance.

Take Serbia, for example. We are now witnessing a powerful public reaction against deeply rooted corruption, which is directly linked to President Vučić and his closest circle.

Russian disinformation and elections

Early elections will soon take place in Germany. Have you noticed any further attempts at interference from Moscow, apart from the campaigns initiated by «trolls»? How do they occur?

Recent investigations confirm that Russian-controlled «bot farms» and influencers are actively spreading disinformation through social networks, using both state propaganda channels, such as Ruptly, and direct online manipulation. In addition, influential politicians promote pro-Russian narratives through media appearances. Some act voluntarily, so to speak, on a public basis, while others are likely financed by industrial empires linked to Putin.

The rhetoric of these individuals questions NATO and the EU. However, the full extent of their influence will only become clear over time

Two parties in Germany - the far-right AfD and the new party of Sahra Wagenknecht (The Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance, - Author) - openly promote Kremlin propaganda not only concerning Ukraine but also against Europe and democratic institutions. It remains unclear whether they receive direct funding from Russia or only indirect support. Meanwhile, within major parties such as the SPD and CDU, remnants of the old camp of «Putin-Verstehers» (a derogatory term for German politicians and experts who sympathise with Vladimir Putin and claim that Germans should understand his position, - Author) still argue that Russia is an important partner for Europe's stability and unity. This position is based on the outdated Russlandpolitik (Germany’s policy towards Russia, - Author), yet it still holds some influence.

Why do pro-Russian or openly anti-European candidates - such as Zoran Milanović in Croatia or Călin Georgescu in Romania - find support among the population? Is it linked to growing scepticism towards the EU or the influence of disinformation campaigns?

Through social networks and pro-Russian media, directly or indirectly supported by Russia, propagandists manage to convince people that the problems in their countries - from healthcare to migration - are the result of poor EU governance and insufficient patriotism from their governments. This is particularly evident in the case of migration. For example, it was the Russian Air Force, not just the Syrian regime, that caused the massive wave of refugees from Syria. The same is happening today with refugees from Ukraine. Russian propaganda manipulates this issue, ignoring the obvious fact: people are being forced to flee precisely because of Russian bombings.

It is astonishing how easy it is today, using uncontrolled media and social networks, to make people believe lies. Europe is facing a problem that is almost impossible to solve

These so-called «social media» are not social at all - they are a hub for spreading injustices and disinformation, which have devastating consequences. However, when they first emerged, the left-liberal camp saw them as a «promised land» of freedom and equality, so these political forces resisted any regulation.

Now, the same people are demanding stricter rules, but it is extremely difficult. Young people who, for instance, use TikTok, believe that restrictions threaten their freedom, although in reality, it is about banning blatantly foolish content. Previous attempts to establish rules for digital media failed due to the resistance of major internet companies. Now, we face one of the biggest challenges - to finally implement the necessary regulations.

Poland has long been and remains one of Ukraine’s key allies. What risks does potential Russian interference in the May elections in Poland pose, and how could it impact support for Ukraine in the region?

Not only is Poland as a whole crucial for Europe, but so is Donald Tusk specifically. As a former President of the European Council and an experienced leader, he is a clear target for Russian efforts to undermine stability. Additionally, Poland is one of Ukraine’s strongest supporters and a key advocate for strengthening the EU’s military capacity, making it a priority target for Russian interference.

However, the Polish people must know that their newly elected democratic government, formed through a complex but legitimate coalition, is well-prepared to withstand this pressure

EU energy blackmail

Ms Harms, how successful have the EU’s efforts been in reducing dependence on Russian energy resources?

Compared to 2022, dependence has decreased. At least, according to the latest data I have seen in Germany, the situation has stabilised. Yet, if we had acted more consistently regarding sanctions, the result would have been better and faster.

It outrages me that «Rosatom» has still not been sanctioned. This company was part of nuclear terror from the first days of the war: the attack on Chornobyl, assaults and occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, and now - strikes on energy infrastructure, which create enormous risks for nuclear power plants in Ukraine.

That is why every time I read positive articles about the nuclear industry in France, I am surprised that those who admire it do not mention its connection with «Rosatom». For instance, EDF, the French nuclear company, is one of its key clients, and the French energy sector remains significantly dependent on imports from Russia.

How can the European Union counter Viktor Orban’s blackmail, as he attempts to use the issue of Russian gas transit to weaken sanctions against Russia?

I believe that the European Union is capable of compensating for imports from Russia through other sources. Thus, this is a problem or a challenge that can only be resolved if Orban also wishes to resolve it. However, even Hungary can survive without Russian gas.

Ukraine’s EU membership disruption and the risks of prolonging the war

What mechanisms do you believe Russia is using to sabotage Ukraine’s European integration aspirations? Is the EU doing enough to stop these attempts?

At every event concerning Ukraine’s integration into the EU, I feel that this is the best decision I have ever witnessed. Although the EU opened its doors to Ukraine too late, it has finally happened - despite Russian aggression.

It was a bold decision both for Ukraine and for the European Union. We are now in the preparatory phase for opening the first stages of negotiations

Undoubtedly, Russian interference, disinformation and other problems exist. The European integration process is already complex. However, the war itself makes meeting the requirements even more difficult. Thus, we are facing a completely new integration process, and predicting its future is challenging.

We are now hearing many statements regarding the end of the war in Ukraine. Everyone is closely watching the actions of US President Donald Trump. While we do not yet have definite outcomes, in your opinion, what risks does a prolonged war in Ukraine pose to the economic, political and military stability of the European Union?

It is not only Trump who says it would be better if the war ended. In reality, those who have suffered, who have lost their families, homes and cities, understand far better why it is crucial for the war to end as soon as possible. They know this much better than Trump.

However, on the other hand, the conditions for a ceasefire or truce must be such that they guarantee Russia will not repeat its attack on Ukraine in the future. This is crucial both for the EU and for Ukraine

Everyone wants to move on to a period of recovery and reconstruction, but we are not there yet.

In Davos, President Zelensky stated that «Europe must establish itself as a strong, global and indispensable player». Can support for Ukraine be considered the key test for Europe as a global player?

Yes, I believe so. The European Union, particularly some leading states that stood in defence of Ukraine even before February 2022, has become a much stronger player in the field of defence and security. However, significant steps still need to be taken, and this has once again become evident after Trump took office.

It is disappointing to see that, despite all the discussions before his inauguration, Europe was not truly prepared for Trump’s return to power. Although the EU has made considerable efforts since 2022, it is still far from being able to fully protect the continent. NATO is the key player here, and Europe now needs to seriously invest in the North Atlantic Alliance and its own security and defence forces.

This is one of the most urgent issues, in my opinion. Unfortunately, if you look at the German election campaign, this issue has not been given enough attention. Even after nearly three years of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, many politicians still hesitate to discuss these critical matters with their voters.

Cover photo: IMAGO/Andreas Friedrichs/Imago Stock and People/East News

The project is co-financed by the Polish-American Freedom Foundation as part of the «Support Ukraine» programme, implemented by the «Education for Democracy» Foundation

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Together with experts in combating disinformation, Sestry analysed the most common Russian narratives found in Ukraine, Poland, Germany and Europe in general. They examined how these messages are tailored for different audiences, the platforms where Russian propaganda is most frequently encountered, how to distinguish destructive content, and whether it achieves its goals.

Constructing Reality

Propaganda always strives to construct an alternative reality and aims to make it as simple as possible, explains Doctor of Political Science and Professor at Kyiv Polytechnic Institute, Lidiia Smola:

- Let me give an example: for weeks, the idea has been spreading that Trump will prohibit the supply of weapons to Ukraine. Moreover, Trump’s extravagant statements provide grounds for various interpretations. This narrative, this framework about a ban on weapons for Ukraine, is continuously supplemented with informational messages.

This starts to destabilise society, making people think: that is it - Trump will come, and it will all end for us

The fundamental goal of Russians, continues Lidiia Smola, is to divide and demoralise:

- To demoralise the part of Ukrainian society engaged in volunteering, making them think there is no point in doing so. To demoralise those on the frontline, to sow discord with messages such as: while you are at war, those in the rear are having fun. That is, to create conflict between those fighting and those in the rear, between those who left and those still in Ukraine.

Russia is not just active, it systematically analyses all the sensitive points in Ukraine

Propaganda for Poland

When it comes to Poland, the current primary goal of Russian propaganda is to instigate fear, negative emotions and disinformation, says Director of the «Democracy and Civil Society» programme at the Institute of Public Affairs (Instytut Spraw Publicznych), Sonia Horonziak:

- This is achieved mainly through the dissemination of fake news online, styled to resemble authentic press reports. These news items predominantly concern Poland’s involvement in the war in Ukraine, the border situation, and the country’s internal affairs.

The strategic goal of Russian propaganda in Poland is to create a situation where, if not pro-Russian, at least neutral attitudes towards Russia prevail, alongside anti-American and anti-European sentiments, notes Michał Marek, head of the external threats analysis group at the National Research Institute NASK:

- Russia’s main objective is to withdraw Poland from the European Union and NATO, to ensure the absence of troops and bases of our Western partners. However, on the way to this goal, they pursue smaller objectives. For instance, they fuel anti-Ukrainian sentiments to make Poland and its government reduce support for Ukraine.

Do they succeed in this? Michał Marek believes not entirely. But where they do succeed, in his opinion, is in inflaming the issues that irritate both Ukrainians and Poles the most.

Propaganda Techniques

«Stop Supporting Ukraine» - this has been Russia’s main narrative in Germany for some time, notes Lea Frühwirth, Senior Research Fellow at the German Centre for Monitoring, Analysis and Strategy (CeMAS):

- This can be presented in various forms: claims about the danger posed by Ukrainian refugees or assertions that continued support for Ukraine threatens the German economy. We also frequently observe content suggesting that supporting Ukraine places Germans under a direct threat of war.

Typical markers of pro-Russian content focus primarily on Ukraine, crafting a particular image of the conflict to dissuade people from supporting Ukraine, continues Lea Frühwirth. Another emphasis seems to be on attacks against the current German government, aligning with Russia’s goal of gradually destabilising the situation in Ukraine.

In recent weeks, Russia has applied a tactic in Ukraine’s information space which might be labelled as «mental fatigue». The idea is that a psychologically and emotionally drained Ukrainian society might eventually accept a frozen conflict and agree to territorial losses, notes Doctor of Political Science and Professor at Kyiv Polytechnic Institute, Lidiia Smola. Russian propaganda attempts to place all responsibility solely on the Ukrainian authorities. While there are indeed many questions to be asked of them, the lack of effective communication, coupled with the absence of public and transparent discussions on significant issues, creates a space for Russian propaganda to act, the expert continues:

- And Russia focuses on this. Had the system of strategic communication at the governmental level operated effectively, had the media endeavoured not just to quickly fill the information space with provocative and manipulative headlines but aimed to inform society thoughtfully, the situation could have been different. Another issue is the credibility of so-called experts.

Nowadays, anyone can call themselves an expert, which completely undermines the notion of expertise

In Polish information space, false and fake news is most commonly disseminated online, especially on major social media platforms and far-right internet portals, says Sonia Horonziak, Director of the «Democracy and Civil Society» programme at the Institute of Public Affairs (Instytut Spraw Publicznych). Often, this information immediately provokes strong emotions, portrays the Polish government in an extremely negative light, and highlights events that adversely affect Polish society:

- Disseminated messages often combine partially truthful information or images but provide them with false context. Thus, we see an authentic photograph associated with a completely different past event.

Moreover, the role of artificial intelligence in creating increasingly sophisticated fake images or videos depicting certain events or individuals, often from the political world, is growing

From a structural perspective, disinformation campaigns such as «Twin» are well-studied and usually follow the same pattern, making them relatively easy to identify, notes Lea Frühwirth, Senior Research Fellow at CeMAS:

- For example, if a self-proclaimed news site appeared in my feed, resembling a well-known German newspaper but disseminating only overtly pro-Russian material, I would automatically become cautious.

Channels of Influence

There are several channels of fake communication in general, continues Lea Frühwirth. The first is the attempt to fill the information space with disinformation on topics of interest to Russia. However, it appears they focus more on the quantity of these messages than on their quality:

- To be manipulative, this content does not even need to contain outright lies. Simply highlighting one aspect of a problem while ignoring others, or pretending to be German citizens expressing concern while actually being part of a bot network, is also misleading. On the other hand, there are local pro-Russian influencers who repeat typical Kremlin talking points. Usually, we cannot determine their motivation - they might be paid or genuinely believe in it.

The war against Ukraine is one of the topics used daily by creators of fake news. This is detailed in a report by SCIENCE+, the largest journalistic network combating disinformation in Central Europe. In 2024, no new key disinformation narratives emerged, instead, existing ones were adapted to current events. The report records manipulations around the threat of war with Russia, societal divisions over positions on Ukraine, and the myth of a conflict between «the West» and «the East». These narratives became part of widespread attacks on democratic elections in Slovakia, Bulgaria, Moldova and Romania.

Young people are most frequently targeted by disinformation. Most do not engage with traditional media and instead obtain information from unreliable influencers. This contributes to a tendency among the youth to support radical or populist politicians.

A striking example is Romania, where the Constitutional Court annulled the results of the first round of presidential elections after President Klaus Iohannis declassified intelligence data showing that Russia had organised thousands of social media accounts to promote the radical pro-Russian politician Călin Georgescu through platforms like TikTok and Telegram. In 2025, presidential elections will be held in Poland. Russia will undoubtedly seek to exert influence, says Michał Marek, head of the external threats analysis group at the National Research Institute NASK:

- But in our current situation in Poland, the Romanian scenario is unlikely. They will not succeed in seriously influencing these elections.

Pro-Russian agents might have an impact on parliamentary elections. However, when it comes to presidential elections, I would not overestimate their ability to exert influence

Tactics, markers, and effectiveness of propaganda

Propaganda typically evokes extreme emotions, explains Sonia Horonziak, Director of the «Democracy and Civil Society» programme at the Institute of Public Affairs (Instytut Spraw Publicznych):

- You should ask yourself why you have not heard this information on public television or radio. Secondly, you should verify this information through various official sources. Most often, such information is not confirmed in any way. Some social networks also add contextual information to certain content, which can influence its perception. It is always worth searching for additional context.

Among the popular tools of Russian propaganda are aggressive rhetoric, threats, intimidation and nuclear blackmail. During the so-called year-end summary, the Russian president reiterated the claim that there are no air defence systems capable of intercepting the «Orieshnik» missile. According to Putin, even the missile defence systems in Poland and Romania would not intercept this missile. However, there is a percentage of people in Poland under the influence of Russian propaganda who might take such threats seriously and perceive other Russian narratives as real, says Michał Marek, head of the external threats analysis group at the National Research Institute NASK:

- Overall, the Polish society does not seem to fear this. It is clear that for many Poles, the war in Europe is perceived as a reality - in Europe, meaning between NATO and Russia. But the threats themselves, the «Orieshnik» topic, are not a factor widely believed by us Poles. Russians have been trying to frighten us for years - with nuclear strikes, with claims we would freeze to death without Russian gas.

So new threats are mostly viewed as just another scare tactic. The effectiveness of such Russian propaganda, frankly speaking, is not very high

Critical thinking

Anyone can fall into the trap of propaganda, says Lea Frühwirth, Senior Research Fellow at the German Centre for Monitoring, Analysis and Strategy (CeMAS):

- Human information processing is imperfect. It is not a pleasant thought, but it is the first step to awareness. We all need to establish a basic level of awareness and critical thinking. I would recommend using reliable and authoritative media outlets that adhere to journalistic standards to stay informed about what is happening in the world. Social media, on the other hand, is an information sphere where we must be prepared to encounter misleading content. If you notice something suddenly causing you excessive emotions, it is worth taking a step back and evaluating rationally to avoid contributing to the spread of fake news.

Russian propaganda typically divides the world into «black» and «white», «us» and «them», attempting to impose this division on Ukrainians. A characteristic approach is the emotional pressure - all these visualisations, publications of videos showing killed Ukrainian soldiers, notes Lidiia Smola, Doctor of Political Science and Professor at Kyiv Polytechnic Institute:

- A marker of propaganda is that you are urged to act impulsively and emotionally. For example, you go to social media and see a photo of an unfamiliar person appealing emotionally, for instance, «like this post because I am going to the frontline». And such posts then garner thousands of likes. Why? Because people want to feel part of something important. However, how these pages are used later and what is disseminated through them is rarely considered.

That is why it is crucial to critically evaluate resources and not succumb to manipulative calls for immediate action

For Ukraine, the factor of despair, constantly fuelled by hostile propagandists, is also significant. This is the narrative of an unbeatable Russia, notes Lidiia Smola:

- It works through emotional swings: from a state of sharp excitement to depression, when people write: everything is lost, we cannot win, Russia is winning. In such cases, I always ask where Russia was in 2022 with all its powerful and prepared army, and where it is now.

This project is co-funded by the Polish-American Freedom Foundation under the «Support Ukraine» programme implemented by the «Education for Democracy» Foundation

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«In Berlin, you pay an agent up to 5 thousand euros just for the right to rent a flat»

- On the morning of 24 February, my sister called me: «The war has begun». I hung up, looked out the window, and saw a four-lane traffic jam, recalls Marharyta Korovina, organiser of public events and a Ukrainian culture festival in Berlin. - At that time, I lived with my mother. My sister said they would take me, but there was nowhere to take my mother. Understanding that I could not leave my mother alone, I refused to leave.

There were fewer and fewer people in our district. Within days, the neighbourhood was deserted, with only the elderly left. And I started helping them. I used my savings to buy them food. Getting groceries at that time was quite a challenge. My task was to find bread for my mother, my neighbours, and myself. At «Silpo» (Ukrainian supermarket chain), they gave out one loaf per person. So I searched all over our district. And I believed the war would soon end...

I also created a TikTok account where talked to Russians through chat roulette. I asked them why they had attacked, what they wanted from Ukraine. They gave all kinds of absurd answers, often aggressive. It was my social experiment to counter the «not all Russians are like that» narrative - I posted conversations with Russians in the public domain. In the first months of the full-scale invasion, my account went viral. Some people used my materials to edit videos for their Telegram channels. Some videos gained a million views in one day. Then I got banned.

By summer 2022, I realised my savings were running out, and I had no income. The office where I had worked before the war had closed. A quick decision was necessary.

Since the situation in Kyiv was already more or less calm, I made the difficult decision to go to Barcelona, as our fund's hub was there. Besides, my sister already lived in Spain. I went there hoping to be among ambitious, motivated and active people but found something entirely different: in the Spanish office, like in an ordinary accounting office, everyone worked from 9 to 3 and then hurried home. I could not focus. I went to Berlin for a couple of days to volunteer... and stayed.

I had no friends or relatives in Berlin, but I was captivated by the enormous Ukrainian creative community here. At every corner, Ukrainian flags: on official buildings, universities, town halls, and even just on the balconies of residential houses. I was amazed by the scale of support for Ukraine.

Moving to Germany can be compared to a person learning to walk and talk again after an injury. You seem like an adult, but your opportunities are like those of a two-year-old child. For a long time, I felt like a non-functional part of society. But now, it seems I have reached the acceptance stage.

A significant problem in Berlin is housing. I was lucky not to live in «Tegel». This is a non-operational airport where a camp for refugees was set up using tents, and nearly everyone arriving from Ukraine passed through it. Using the programme for Ukrainian refugees, I lived for the first two months with a young German family. Simultaneously, I searched for a flat.

Finding accommodation in overcrowded Berlin is a task with a star, so social networking works best here (word of mouth). Ukrainians created Telegram channels and found local resources that worked better than the official housing search. However, estate agents are also used here, and that is another corrupt scheme. Agents often ask for 1-5 thousand euros as a «provision» - a one-time cash payment directly to the agent, not included in the contract. Essentially, a cash bribe for the right to rent a flat. Perhaps agents artificially create such demand that people are ready to pay any money just to get a housing contract. An open flat viewing in Berlin is a queue of a hundred people. You pay the agent to be prioritised. Personally, I found a flat by talking to people because I kept asking everyone about housing.

Germany is an entirely different world. I thought there would be technological progress here. Instead, everything is slow, unclear and bureaucratic. This was a shock to me. I know that even most Germans are dissatisfied with this.

«I can only do things related to Ukraine»

- Was it difficult to adapt to Germany?

- In Berlin, I quickly got to know interesting people. We began meeting and creating projects. I felt there were resources here through which I could do much good for Ukraine. Because I can not do anything unrelated to volunteering or Ukraine. When you constantly think about the war at home, other things barely concern you.

Imagine, here in Berlin, I have seen people from Mariupol who still carry keys to their flats in Ukraine, even though those no longer exist

Regarding the adaptation of Ukrainians in Berlin, I have a basis for comparison - with Barcelona, Paris and Lisbon. Kyiv had a special relationship with Berlin even before the war, so, unsurprisingly, many cultural figures, artists and activists relocated here. Today, Berlin feels like an extension of the Golden Gate and Podil. Events here easily gather Ukrainian music, food, and goods. We even received a proposal to hold «Kurazh Bazar» in Berlin, but we organised something in a similar format called «Motanka».

Ukrainians in Berlin are what keeps me here: active people who tirelessly keep Ukraine in the informational spotlight, fight against disinformation, talk about Ukrainian culture and history, shout about the repressions our nation suffered under the Soviets, and open the eyes of the «concerned» and not-so-concerned Europeans to the proximity of the war and Russia’s colonial, imperialist, and terrorist nature.

Moreover, many Ukrainians in Germany are already integrated and well-acquainted with local sentiments. Most such individuals now occupy leadership positions in Ukrainian organisations, cultural institutions, embassies, etc.

Over the past three years in Berlin, several Ukrainian restaurants, beauty salons, and a gallery have opened, but the largest focus is on public organisations. People did not bring their businesses here since Germany is not the most favourable place for entrepreneurs. Instead, they brought their social and charitable initiatives. Everything here revolves around culture, politics and information.

In 2023, together with German, Georgian and Ukrainian like-minded individuals, we registered a public organisation here called Mizelium. By law, Ukrainians can not establish their own organisation in Germany. Its composition must include Germans. What do we do? Initially, we collected humanitarian aid and sent it to Ukraine. Then we shifted to organising festivals, concerts and workshops to introduce Europeans to Ukrainian culture and make it trendy.

I am learning German and will soon take the B2 level exam. I plan to obtain grant funds for our cultural projects.

Our main idea is to show the colossal difference between Ukrainian and Russian cultures. Many Germans do not distinguish between them

A German acquaintance once said he did not even know that beyond Poland there was another country. He thought it was immediately Russia

«We created the largest Ukrainian culture festival in Europe - for 10 thousand people»

- Tell us about the projects in Berlin you participated in. Why is this important to you?

- In 2023, we organised the largest Ukrainian culture festival in Europe, «Motanka». A year earlier, in 2022, we launched its pilot version. We chose an underground location, little-known even to Berliners - a place where hippies live: a river, yurts, a bar made of planks, a small stage. We arranged an exhibition in a boathouse garage.

A year later, we organised a large-scale festival.

Six floors of various formats: music, cinema, exhibitions, a pop-up market of Ukrainian brands, food, discussions about culture and politics. Over three days, about 10 thousand people attended our festival

We created this event without grant funding. We offered collaboration to Ukrainians from the cultural sphere in Berlin, and all of them agreed. We did not expect such a scale but were happy. The location was provided to us for free. We enlisted the help of partners and sponsors who provided free services totalling approximately 300,000 euros.

I would call Berlin a decision-making hub. Many politically significant events happen here.

Now, in 2024, the intensity of Ukrainian informational events is still quite high. However, greater involvement is desirable because, for example, there are fewer and fewer people at protests and rallies.

There is an event called «Café «Kyiv» with a political focus. Last time, Ursula von der Leyen participated, and Vitali Klitschko was present. Our ambassadors also joined. Panel discussions were held, the documentary «20 Days in Mariupol» was shown, and there was an exhibition titled «Yolka», which had been with us on Maidan in 2014 - there was a queue at the entrance. The first event was held at a place called «Moscow Restaurant». On the day of the event, this name was symbolically covered with a banner reading «Café Kyiv». Politicians attend this event to emphasise their pro-Ukrainian image.

Our «Motanka» was created to engage people who unknowingly discovered Ukraine. Through collaborations with local artists, brands, and musicians, we managed to unite an audience and subtly involve thousands of Berliners, showing them the creative side of Ukraine without alienating them with the topic of war.

«In the state I have been in for almost three years, Frank Wilde has been in nearly his entire life»

- How do Germans now view everything Ukrainian?

- Until 1989, Berlin was divided by a wall, and the eastern part of the city still significantly differs from the western part. Even election results reflect this. Here, people romanticise the Soviet Union and Russian politics. Even the generation that did not experience life in the USSR somehow feels nostalgic about it. Therefore, their attitude towards everything Ukrainian, naturally, is not positive.

Russia, thanks to friendly relations with Merkel, deeply ingrained itself in the minds of Germans, and people «outside politics» miss it because kebabs used to cost 3,50 euros under her rule, and now they cost 8. Gas was also cheaper.

There are Germans who still feel «backed into a corner» because of World War II. This has led to the quiet emergence of a second wave of Nazism, which is now breaking out of the underground. For instance, the popularity of the AfD party is growing. This pro-Russian party plays on Germans' emotions (the main ideological theses of the AfD are directed against European integration and immigration - Edit.)

In general, discrimination based on nationality is prohibited by law in Germany (this is stated in the constitution). Therefore, no German would do this openly or transparently. I have not noticed such conflicts here.

However, there are also many conscientious Germans who are interested in Ukraine, attend Ukrainian demonstrations, speak at them, and provide support.

- You have been working with Frank Wilde, a designer and a great friend of Ukraine, for over two years. What is the most important aspect of this collaboration for you?

- I learned about Frank while sitting in a bomb shelter in Kyiv, before I left. When I arrived in Berlin, I met him at one of the events dedicated to Ukraine. He literally attends all such events. When we organised the first «Motanka», I suggested he hold his own auction. He agreed and donated part of the proceeds to support Ukraine.

I offered him my help with PR and managing his communications. Now, I am his volunteer manager.

Frank played a key role in my stay in Berlin. He is a very wise person. In the state I have been in for almost three years, he has been in nearly his entire life. He is always fighting. In collaborating with Frank, I am motivated by gratitude. I want to repay him on behalf of all Ukrainians for what he does for us.

«I dream of reviving my grandmother's village»

- What helps you hold on? What do you dream about?

- That is a good question. I still live with my pre-war dreams. I have a country house in the Sumy region, which I have always loved. My grandmother used to live there, and it was always cosy and cheerful at her place. When she passed away, we bought a house next door. Growing up, I saw how the village changed. It began to decline because many people left. Even then, I dreamed of reviving this village.

During the Covid lockdown, I went there for a month and saw that people had nothing to do or entertain themselves with. I started thinking about how to change this.

I arranged with the local cultural centre to use a space to create a place for young people. I also planned to organise a rural retreat for city dwellers - giving rides in a cart, teaching people to herd geese and cows, and holding a rural rave party. Additionally, I wanted to find grandmothers who knit, embroider, or create other interesting handmade items and help them sell their crafts. Handmade work is very popular now. I even created a social media account for this village. Then the war started. But when I feel sad or lose hope, I open my laptop and write down my ideas about the village. This is now my way of recovering.

Photos: private archive and the heroine's Instagram