Professor Anastasia Fedyk: Americans want to invest in new technologies developed in Ukraine

The West had all the tools to foresee Russia's war against Ukraine - and chose to ignore them. Even before 2014, analysis reached NATO's highest offices: the annexation of Crimea, the threat to Mariupol, the Russian Federation's dominance in the Black Sea. The forecasts were accurate, but most member states opted for the illusion of partnership with the Kremlin.

Are changes still possible? What is required to achieve them? And can NATO remain an effective security alliance in a new era of threats? These and other questions were addressed in an interview with Sestry by Dr Stefanie Babst - one of the most influential security strategists in Europe, who worked at NATO for over 20 years, including as Head of the Strategic Foresight Team. Today, she is an independent analyst, the author of a book on the West's «blind spots» in its strategy toward Russia, and an active participant in international discussions on war, peace and security.

Ukraine, Russia and the strategic miscalculations of the West

Maryna Stepanenko: You led NATO's Strategic Foresight Team. How do you assess the West's ability to foresee Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine? Were there signals that were simply not heard, or perhaps deliberately ignored?

‍Stefanie Babst: There were many warnings that went unheeded. Allow me to explain. In international relations, it is crucial to accurately assess the mindset, capabilities and intentions of another actor. NATO failed to do this with Russia. As the Head of Strategic Foresight at the Alliance, I issued the first serious warning in 2013 - a few months before the annexation of Crimea. I presented an analysis outlining Russia's malicious intentions and its military preparations against Ukraine.

It was reviewed by the Secretary General and discussed with member states, but no action was taken

Some countries - the Baltic States and Poland - took the analysis seriously. Others - notably Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom - preferred to maintain the NATO-Russia partnership. From 2014 onwards, we intensified our analysis, forecasting actions such as the seizure of Mariupol, dominance in the Black Sea and the use of Donbas as a staging ground. These forecasts were presented at the highest levels, including the NATO Council, but were ultimately dismissed.

In 2015 and 2016, we broadened our focus to include China and its ties with Russia, offering future scenarios and forecasting so-called «black swans» - high-impact events that are hard to predict, seem unlikely but could have serious consequences if they occur. Again, many perceived this only as «intellectual exercises». Thus, NATO possessed the tools of foresight - and chose to ignore them. And that comes at a very high cost.

In your work, you call for a review of the West's strategy toward Russia. In your view, what «blind spots» remain in Western approaches - particularly regarding support for Ukraine?

Three years ago, I called for a powerful, multifaceted deterrence strategy to help Ukraine not just freeze the war but win it. I invoked George Kennan's Cold War approach, urging the use of all available instruments - economic, diplomatic and military - to push Russia out of Ukraine. But apart from some Baltic and Northern European countries, no one took this seriously.

NATO and the EU still lack a defined end goal. If Ukraine's victory were the objective, a corresponding strategy would have been developed

Instead, Western leaders underestimated Ukraine's resilience and failed to act decisively even after Russia crossed countless red lines. President Biden, despite his commitment to Ukraine, framed his approach around what the United States would not do: we will not provoke Russia, we will not give Ukrainians long-range weapons, we will not do this or that. This is not a strategy. Now, with Trump’s return, many European governments are passively hoping for a US-Russian agreement that merely freezes the war - something I believe is dangerous both for Ukraine and Europe.

My main criticism is the lack of political will in the West. Too many still see this as Russia's war against Ukrainians. But it is our war too

Stefanie, why do you think Europe failed to prepare effectively for Trump’s presidency?

Planning within NATO and European governments is often difficult, as politicians typically focus on short-term goals, usually only a month ahead. In times of emergency, particularly due to Washington's unpredictability, Europe must abandon crisis management mode and stop reacting to every event, such as a new tweet.

Europe must be firm with the United States, clearly communicating that their actions - including threats to countries like Canada and Denmark, withholding intelligence from Ukraine and halting cyber operations against Russia - are unacceptable. These decisions had deadly consequences, and member states should not be afraid to hold the United States accountable for violating the fundamental principles of the Washington Treaty.

Mark Rutte, the NATO Secretary General, recently visited Florida to meet President Trump, hoping to impress him with defence spending figures. He praised Trump’s leadership and even claimed that Trump had «broken the deadlock» in relations with Russia. However, this is detached from the reality of ongoing Russian attacks.

If the NATO Secretary General lacks a clear message, the best approach is silence, focusing on supporting member states and protecting them from any threat. We do not have time for empty words and political games.

Europeans must remain immune to American political theatre, focusing on strengthening defence capability and supporting Ukraine’s defence industry so it can resist Russian aggression

Migration and war

Germany is no longer the EU leader in asylum requests from South American and Middle Eastern refugees. At the same time, in the first quarter of 2025, applications from Ukrainians rose by 84 per cent. What does this indicate?

It is entirely understandable that many Ukrainians have chosen to leave their country for personal and professional reasons - this is natural, and no one should be blamed for it. But this migration has political consequences in Germany, particularly when far-right parties exploit it by portraying Ukrainian refugees as a burden on the social system, regardless of their skills or motivation. These sentiments are especially strong in eastern Germany, where parties like AfD and certain left-wing populist movements have gained support.

What concerns me is the lack of strong counteraction from the federal government in Berlin - clearer messaging and political leadership are needed

If more Ukrainians arrive, I hope the next government will take a positive stance, recognising that many of them can significantly contribute to the German workforce. This would mean reducing bureaucracy, accelerating integration and facilitating their employment. Whether this happens remains to be seen.

Continuing on this topic, in recent weeks, some districts in Germany have publicly declared that they can no longer accommodate Ukrainian refugees due to overburdened social systems. How do you assess these sentiments?

It is true that local communities across Germany still face difficulties in accommodating refugees - an issue that arose after Chancellor Merkel’s decision to open the borders, leading to a large influx of refugees from Syria, Afghanistan and other countries. Many municipalities remain overwhelmed by demands for housing, language training and integration support. However, Ukrainian refugees do not pose the same challenges.

Ukrainians generally integrate well, bring strong skills and education and do not contribute to social tensions

In contrast, some refugees from the Middle East struggle to adapt to liberal democratic norms, which fuels far-right narratives, particularly in eastern Germany. Parties like AfD and figures such as Sahra Wagenknecht exploit this, promoting anti-Ukrainian, pro-concession rhetoric that ignores the reality of Russian occupation.

Unfortunately, mainstream democratic parties are not doing enough to push them back. With growing support from American right-wing populists, such as those connected to Trump or Musk, this polarisation may deepen further, posing a serious threat to democratic cohesion in Europe.

Europe on the brink of war

Amid full-scale war in Ukraine, initiatives have emerged in Poland and Germany to prepare schoolchildren for emergencies. Does this indicate a deeper shift in Europe's security culture, where defence is no longer solely the army's responsibility, but that of the entire society?

Although some defence-related courses have begun in Germany, they remain insufficient, and the wider public remains largely unprepared - both mentally and physically - to play a defensive role.

Serious debates are now underway about reinstating military conscription, but surveys show that two-thirds of people aged 20 to 30 would refuse to serve, with many saying they would rather emigrate than defend the country.

This reflects a deeper issue: decades of political messaging have conditioned Germans to believe they live in peace, surrounded by allies, and need not prepare for conflict

As a result, Germany also lacks bunkers for emergencies, civil defence training and basic resilience measures for the population. Changing this mindset will require strong political leadership. Without it, the Bundeswehr will remain under-equipped and unable to contribute significantly to efforts such as a potential coalition in Ukraine.

We see civil defence becoming part of public policy, from educating children to testing alarm systems. Is Europe beginning to think seriously about its own resilience in the face of potential escalation beyond Ukraine?

Undoubtedly. Some countries, such as Finland, Sweden, Poland and the Baltic States, have prioritised both military capability and societal resilience in recent years. In cities such as Riga and Warsaw, the Russian threat is well understood. However, countries like Germany, Belgium, Portugal, France and others still view Russia’s war against Ukraine as a regional issue.

Fortunately, leaders such as Kaja Kallas are advocating for a long-term strategy against Russia. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, I have argued that we must prepare for a protracted conflict, as long as Putin’s regime remains in power, Russia will continue to pose a threat to Ukraine and the whole of Europe.

Strategic vision

Given your views on NATO's evolution and the need for a new coalition, potentially the so-called «coalition of the willing», how do you envisage its structure? What strategic or institutional frameworks will be important to effectively counter Russian aggression, considering internal challenges within NATO, particularly due to the influence of populist leaders, including Trump?

During my time at NATO, I was proud of my team’s ability to anticipate challenges before they emerged, especially regarding NATO’s enlargement. I was actively involved in the admission of new members, including the Baltic States, Slovenia and Slovakia.

One of the moments I had hoped to witness was seeing Ukraine’s flag at NATO headquarters, but I no longer believe that is a realistic goal

Instead, I believe Ukraine should focus on building a new coalition with like-minded countries, rather than pursuing NATO membership. The Alliance, particularly under the influence of destructive politics, is becoming increasingly divided.

If I were advising President Zelensky, I would recommend not wasting energy on NATO accession but rather focusing on strengthening a broader, more flexible alliance to counter Russian aggression. This would allow us to move beyond the status quo and prepare for the future.

Considering the current dynamics within NATO, how long do you think the Alliance can maintain its current structure before significant changes become inevitable? Do you have a timeframe in mind?

When President Trump was elected, I predicted he would undermine the rules-based order, and we are already seeing significant damage done to NATO, especially concerning the US commitments. European countries have started discussing enhancing the European pillar within NATO, planning to prepare for a potential US withdrawal within five to ten years. However, I believe that timeframe is overly optimistic - we may have only five to ten months before we witness new disruptions.

Looking back, it is clear NATO missed the opportunity to prepare for these challenges. In 2016, I prepared a document for the Secretary General outlining potential harm Trump could cause, but it was dismissed at the time. The issues I raised remain relevant today, and NATO's bureaucracy is too risk-averse to plan for unforeseen scenarios.

If the Alliance fails to act, it risks becoming a reactive organisation that merely responds to Trump’s tweets instead of proactively working toward the future

I hope that countries such as France, the United Kingdom and Northern European states will cooperate with Ukraine to create a new joint alliance capable of better confronting future challenges.

Cover photo: MANDEL NGAN/AFP/East News

This project is co-financed by the Polish-American Freedom Foundation under the «Support Ukraine» programme, implemented by the Education for Democracy Foundation

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Negotiations in Riyadh, agreements on navigation in the Black Sea, and now the White House's attempts to achieve a truce by April 20th - all these steps create the illusion of diplomatic progress. But is this truly a step towards peace or another political manoeuvre?

Russia, despite its promises, continues to attack Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. The West, meanwhile, is considering easing sanctions against the Russian agricultural sector, even though Moscow has made no concessions. All this is happening against the backdrop of the Trump administration’s attempts to use the war for its own geopolitical game.

Does the White House have a clear strategy, or is it merely an attempt to secure a «success» before Easter? Is diplomacy turning into a tool for weakening sanctions that ultimately benefits the Kremlin? This is the subject of an exclusive interview with John Bolton - American Republican politician, diplomat and former National Security Advisor to Donald Trump (2018-2019).

The negotiation process

‍Maryna Stepanenko: Last week, we saw another round of negotiations in Riyadh. How would you assess their progress?

‍John Bolton: Certain agreements were reached regarding a ceasefire in the Black Sea in terms of the conditions under which commercial vessels may freely cross the Black Sea without being attacked. Commercial vessels must not be used for military purposes. And I believe we have generally returned to what was being discussed with Turkey back in 2022.

This may be progress, but I believe Russia is as interested in this as Ukraine, so that they can transport part of their agricultural products. I do not believe this necessarily guarantees progress in ceasing hostilities on land or towards a more comprehensive ceasefire, let alone a final settlement.

We witnessed Russia breaking its promise to stop strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Moreover, the attacks have not only continued but intensified. Now we have agreements aimed at ensuring safe navigation in the Black Sea and preventing the use of commercial vessels for military purposes. How can the United States guarantee that Russia will honour any agreements, given its history of violating international commitments?

I do not believe any guarantees exist. That is precisely why President Zelenskyy is so adamant about security guarantees - he understands Russia’s track record all too well.

An agreement can be reached on almost anything, but a Russian signature will not prevent a third invasion if Moscow decides to launch it

Many of these errors were made in 2014, ultimately leading to Russia’s second invasion. But the damage has been done, and the idea that the simple signing of a document ensures lasting peace and stability is fundamentally flawed - especially if the agreement leaves certain territories in Russian hands, making it inherently inadequate.

The United States announced its intention to support the resumption of Russian exports of agricultural products and fertilisers, including by lowering maritime insurance costs and improving access to ports and payment systems. Does this not contradict existing sanctions policy, particularly given the lack of Russian concessions toward achieving real peace?

Yes, I believe this reflects a relaxation of sanctions that provides Russia with more economic opportunities than it previously had, without any clear justification. Ukraine has been relatively successful in exporting its agricultural products from Odesa via the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus.

I am not certain it will truly benefit from this agreement. It offers certain assurances that vessels will not become targets, but ultimately, the real beneficiary of the Black Sea deal may very well be Russia.

Does this initiative not set a precedent whereby Moscow can use diplomatic negotiations as a tool to ease sanctions without altering its aggressive policies?

Russia's short-term diplomatic strategy is quite clear: to lift as many restrictions and as much pressure as possible while continuing to wage war, particularly as they believe the battlefield dynamics favour them.

Their primary objective is to ease the economic pressure they are facing. Although this pressure has not been as severe as it could have been, it is still significant enough to prompt them to seek relief

The real question is why the United States should provide such relief if Russia is not changing its behaviour. If they are not making meaningful concessions on a ceasefire or demonstrating genuine intent to end the war, then there is no justification for reducing pressure. Thus far, they have shown no signs of doing either.

Peace by Easter

The White House is seeking to broker a ceasefire agreement by April 20th, which this year coincides with Easter for both Catholics and Orthodox Christians. In your opinion, does the Trump administration have a specific strategy for this?

No, I do not believe there is a specific strategy. At best, Trump has moved from claiming he could resolve the war in a single day to postponing the timeline to April. By Easter, there may be a declaration of progress so that he can claim success, but I would be very surprised if a comprehensive ceasefire were achieved by then.

As I see it, the Kremlin does not consider a ceasefire to be in its interests. They are willing to humour Trump because they have already secured major concessions from him on long-term matters - no full restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, no NATO membership and no NATO security guarantees. The Russians do not wish to risk losing these advantages. Therefore, while they may engage in negotiations, there is no real indication that they intend to alter their long-term objectives.

US Special Representative Steve Witkoff identified the greatest obstacle to resolving the war in Ukraine as the status of Crimea and the four regions of mainland Ukraine occupied by Russia, calling them the «elephant in the room» in peace negotiations. Are there realistic scenarios for reclaiming these territories? What diplomatic, military or economic instruments might support this aim?

I believe there are alternatives, but they will likely involve a protracted war. The key issue is whether Ukraine can continue to fight if the United States again suspends military assistance. That is the leverage Trump possesses.

As for Witkoff, I believe he is frequently influenced by Russian propaganda, and what you have just mentioned is a prime example of that

The four regions and Crimea were not some internal issue - they were the targets of unprovoked Russian aggression both in 2014 and 2022. If anything, they are Russia’s problem, not Ukraine’s.

US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz proposed the idea of beginning negotiations to freeze front lines «where they currently stand». What consequences might this have?

Well, I am very concerned. One of the main issues I have with a ceasefire is that if it is declared along the current lines of contact and negotiations begin in Geneva, Vienna or even Riyadh, that line of ceasefire could quickly become a de facto border.

The longer the negotiations drag on, the more Russia will work to consolidate its presence - establishing administrative structures, integrating the occupied territories into its governance system and treating them as though they are part of Russia.

Eventually, they will claim that returning these territories is impossible. That is why I believe a ceasefire in this context poses a serious risk for Ukraine

Trump and Putin - a reset in relations

Russia speaks frequently of resetting relations with the United States. Is this realistic? What are the long-term security implications for the United States and NATO of Trump's growing trust in Putin?

Putin manipulates Trump with remarkable ease, relying on his KGB training and clear understanding of Russia’s strategic interests. Unlike him, Trump appears not to recognise any significant American interests in this situation.

He is willing to abandon Ukraine’s position because it simply does not matter to him

Trump sees his relationship with Putin as personal, believing that if he gets along with the Russian leader, then US-Russian relations must be strong. But Putin does not view it that way. This overly simplistic and naive approach to foreign policy - where everything is reduced to personal dynamics - is precisely what Putin exploits to achieve his own goals at Ukraine’s expense.

Recently, Bild published a rather dramatic report suggesting that Russia might invade Lithuanian territory as early as this autumn. How realistic is this scenario?

From a military standpoint, Russia could attempt such an operation, perhaps to secure a corridor to the Kaliningrad exclave. However, I do not think it is likely. Putin is eyeing several other parts of the former Soviet Union - Central Asia, the Caucasus and Moldova - where he might see opportunities to reassert Russian control.

If a ceasefire were reached in Ukraine, I believe he would prioritise these regions over the far riskier step of a direct invasion of NATO territory

However, if Trump continues to weaken NATO, Putin may eventually decide the risk is worth taking.

How would a potential US retreat from active European engagement under Trump affect the regional balance of power, and could the EU compensate for this security vacuum?

I believe that a US withdrawal from NATO would be a catastrophic mistake for both the United States and Europe.

Even a significant weakening of the Alliance would have serious consequences. Putin understands this well

He knows Trump is only in office for four years, and he may see this as an opportunity. Encouraging Trump to take steps that weaken or even dismantle NATO could bring long-term benefits for Russia. But Putin also realises that this window will not last forever - he cannot count on more than four years. That is why he is trying to manipulate Trump, seeking through diplomacy and political influence to achieve what the Russian military has so far failed to accomplish in Ukraine.

Given the current tensions in relations between Canada and the US - something few could have predicted - do you believe Canada might strengthen its cooperation with Europe to form a NATO-like alliance without the United States, in order to enhance European security?

Canada may attempt to do so, but it would be a serious mistake - for Canada, for Europe and for all interested parties. If the United States withdraws from NATO or if Europe effectively pushes the United States out, it will be a major blunder. Despite the damage that Trump has already caused and may yet cause, we must take a long-term perspective. He has 46 months left in office, but security relations between Europe and the United States will endure for decades. During the Cold War, one of Russia’s key objectives was to divide the West, but it never succeeded.

We now risk doing this to ourselves. It is absolutely vital to avoid that

It will not be easy with Trump, but we must remain focused on the long-term objective.

Trump’s approval ratings and another scandal in his administration

Although Trump's approval rating is at a personal high, it still remains below the 50 per cent threshold, and a slight majority of voters (51 per cent) currently disapprove of his performance. How focused is the American public on the White House's policy regarding Ukraine? Is there potential for public pressure on Trump to continue military support for Kyiv?

I still believe that is possible. Trump's approval ratings are declining, but for years, people have noted that he has what is often referred to as a «high floor and low ceiling» - meaning his ratings tend to remain within a narrow range.

At the same time, although Trump is the newly elected president, he is also a «lame duck» president, as he cannot run for a third term. This means his approval ratings could fall even further during a second term than they did during the first.

It is unclear how events will unfold, but for now, his ratings are gradually declining. If tariff uncertainty continues to affect the economy, this trend may persist.

Mr Bolton, during Donald Trump's first term, you served as his National Security Advisor. What was your initial reaction when you learned about the scandal involving the addition of The Atlantic’s editor-in-chief Jeffrey Goldberg to a closed chat where the topic of a US military strike on Yemen was discussed? What does such a precedent signify?

It was truly shocking. I cannot imagine why anyone would even consider using an unsecured, non-government communication channel. Signal is unlikely to replace the highly secure network that the US government has spent vast sums to develop over many years. No one has offered a reasonable explanation for this - because, frankly, I do not believe one exists. This is a serious issue for the Trump administration. We shall have to wait and see whether it dissipates or not.

But one thing is clear - when high-ranking American officials act so recklessly, it only encourages America’s adversaries to intensify their espionage efforts

During our conversation, you emphasised that Trump’s time in office is limited to four years and that he will eventually leave the White House. Do you believe JD Vance might be a contender to succeed him in the future? What would such a figure in the White House mean for America, the world and global security?

It is far from certain that he will even receive the Republican nomination. His chances will largely depend on how popular the Trump administration is two to two-and-a-half years from now. If the economy slips into recession due to tariffs, it will damage anyone associated with Trump's presidency.

Meanwhile, although the Democratic Party has shown little momentum in the four months since the election, it may field a strong candidate in 2028. There are no guarantees that Vance will win the nomination or become president.

Historically, only two vice presidents have been elected president immediately after their vice-presidential terms: George H. W. Bush in 1988 and, before him, Martin Van Buren in the early 19th century. It is a rare occurrence. Some vice presidents have won presidential elections later in their careers, but direct successors to the president they served with are extremely rare.

This project is co-financed by the Polish-American Freedom Foundation under the «Support Ukraine» programme, implemented by the Education for Democracy Foundation

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