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September is not only the beginning of autumn and the new school year. This is the hope that Russian missiles will soon stop flying over Ukrainian schools and homes, that the lives of Ukrainian children will be safe, and that the enemy will forever quench its aggressive appetites and disappear
Roman Oleksiv and Oleksandra Pascal, who suffered due to the attacks of the Russian Federation, performed a gentle dance at the Summit of First Ladies and Gentlemen. During the full-scale invasion, 577 Ukrainian children died, and another 1,628 were injured. Photo: Press materials
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The first day of school for Ukrainian schoolchildren — September 2 — began to the accompaniment of Russian rockets. Instead of sweet sleep in their beds, the children were forced to flee to the bomb shelters, where they tried to get at least a little more sleep. But the enemy did not stop the attack, firing more than a dozen cruise missiles and about a dozen ballistic missiles at Kyiv alone. And in two days, the most tragic event in Lviv happened - during the attack, a whole family died - a mother and three daughters. But, despite this, Ukraine continues to live. Indomitable Ukrainians demonstrate their strength and power in dances, at exhibitions, on catwalks. Because the Russian enemy is unable to do one thing - break the spirit of Ukrainians.
Text: Natalya Ryaba
Photo: Michal Cizek / AFP/ East News
On September 7, demonstrators staged a protest in Prague, holding blue and yellow umbrellas. The participants of the rally called for effective air defense for Ukraine and to give it the opportunity to strike back. Demonstrators created a "map" of Ukraine using blue and yellow umbrellas.
Photo: Anatolii STEPANOV / AFP/ East News
Students of the International Academy of Personnel Management watch as rescuers put out a fire in one of the buildings of the university after a rocket attack on Kyiv on September 2, 2024. While hiding in the bomb shelter, the students heard the whistling of rockets and explosions.
Photo: Diego Herrera Carcedo / Anadolu/ AFP/East News
Ukrainian military medics render aid to a wounded Ukrainian soldier at a stabilization point in the Chasiv Yar region on September 6, 2024.
Photo: Anatolija Stepanowa / AFP/East News
A Ukrainian servicewoman talks on the phone with her children. On September 13, Russia and Ukraine conducted another exchange of prisoners. 49 Ukrainians returned home — 23 women and 26 men. For the first time in a long time, it was possible to return the "Azovs" to Ukraine. The United Arab Emirates helped organize the exchange.
Photo: Yuriy Dyachyshyn / AFP/East News
Ukrainian schoolchildren sing the national anthem during the ceremony for the beginning of the new academic year in Lviv, September 2, 2024.
Photo: Yuriy Dyachyshyn / AFP/East News
September 4 became the most tragic for Lviv during the entire war. A mother and her three daughters were killed in the attack. Only the father remained alive. The whole city came to the funeral of the dead. As a result of shelling in Lviv, seven people died, 66 were injured. Also, 188 buildings were damaged, including 19 architectural monuments.
Photo: Siergiej SUPINSKY / AFP/East News
A couple looks at posters depicting fallen Ukrainian soldiers of the Azov Brigade at an open-air exhibition in Kyiv on September 23, 2024.
Photo: Joe Giddens / PA Images / Forum
Freya Brown, a dog trainer in the British Army, with her military dog Zac during a training session with Ukrainian army personnel, at a barracks in the East Midlands, U.K., September 10, 2024. Two years after invasion, large areas of Ukraine are covered in landmines and unexploded ordnance, including cluster munitions, and dogs play a key role in keeping soldiers and civilians safe.
Photo: матеріали для преси
Presentation of Veronika Danilova's collection as part of Ukrainian Fashion Week, September 1, 2024. The designer dedicated her collection called "Garden of the Clouds" to her homeland, inspired by memories of a Ukrainian garden and blossoming apple trees.
Фоторедакторка, авторка текстів про фотографію. Протягом 16 років працювала у виданні «Gazeta Wyborcza», 6 з яких — головною фоторедакторкою. Випускниця факультету журналістики та політології Варшавського університету, а також Європейської академії фотографії. Викладає прес-фотографію в Університеті гуманітарних і соціальних наук у Варшаві (SWPS).
R E K L A M A
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Over the past week, former President Donald Trump has mentioned various figures regarding the military aid the United States has provided to Ukraine over three years of war. He has cited amounts such as $500 billion and $350 billion.
According to estimates by the "Economists for Ukraine" group, the military aid transferred by the U.S. to Ukraine amounts to $18.3 billion. An additional $32.6 billion represents direct budgetary support in the form of reimbursements, which was distributed, among other means, through the World Bank. Meanwhile, the U.S. government has assessed the total volume of its military aid to Ukraine at $65.9 billion.
— We analyzed a vast amount of publicly available data and identified the reasons for discrepancies in the reported figures, — explains Anastassia Fedyk. — When considering only military aid, our experts assessed all the equipment and technology Ukraine was set to receive, taking into account their condition, age, and usability. It makes a significant difference whether equipment was newly manufactured by American companies last year or if it had been out of use for over a decade and was marked for decommissioning. Evaluating all such equipment at the same value is incorrect.
"In 2024, the total amount of military aid to Ukraine constituted 0.25% of the U.S. annual federal budget" — Anastassia Fedyk
For instance, while the U.S. Department of Defense reports that it has transferred $31 billion worth of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine (under the Presidential Drawdown Authority, which allows the U.S. president to provide military aid from Pentagon stockpiles without congressional approval), the majority of this equipment was outdated and no longer in use by the U.S. Armed Forces. According to expert estimates, the actual value of this aid is around $12.5 billion.
Another crucial aspect to consider when calculating expenses is how much the United States has gained in profit or other benefits by providing aid to Ukraine.
— We plan to analyze this aspect in detail in our next study and evaluate the specific economic benefits the U.S. has gained from military and financial support to Ukraine. This includes increased profits for the defense industry and new contracts for American companies, — notes Anastassia Fedyk.
Scholars from the University of California, Berkeley, the Stockholm School of Economics, Minerva University, and the AI for Good Foundation worked on the report for approximately two months. "The main goal of this study is to prevent disinformation and the spread of false data regarding U.S. aid to Ukraine. It also aims to demonstrate, using concrete figures, that European countries and the United Kingdom have provided Ukraine with equipment, weapons, and other types of aid in proportions comparable to the U.S. contribution," Fedyk explains. Notably, the European Union estimates the total volume of its financial, military, and humanitarian assistance at $145 billion, while the United Kingdom has provided nearly $16 billion.
Why, then, does former U.S. President Donald Trump exaggerate the aid figures so drastically? According to Anastassia Fedyk, this may be an attempt to negotiate more favorable terms in upcoming resource agreements or a strategy to discredit the previous administration by portraying its policies as unprofessional and wasteful. Specifically, Trump may be trying to create the impression that his predecessors neglected American citizens while allegedly spending "enormous" amounts to support Ukraine, which is suffering from the war with Russia.
— That is why it was important for us to present accurate data — specific amounts, figures, and facts — to show the real state of affairs. We wanted to prove that American citizens were not deprived of access to social or government services due to aid to Ukraine, explains Anastassia Fedyk.
On the contrary, many people gained jobs, and companies involved in the production and supply of aid expanded their manufacturing capacities and contributed to budget revenues
In her opinion, the results of this analysis will also be useful for Ukraine, as they will allow for negotiations on equal terms, provide a better understanding of the real value of the aid received, and prevent manipulations regarding its scale.
The researchers from "Economists for Ukraine" also analyzed allegations of corruption and possible embezzlement of funds coming from the U.S.
They found that the level of corruption associated with the use of American aid is among the lowest compared to all other countries that have received support from the United States
— Accusations of corruption can harm Ukraine’s reputation as an aid recipient. However, thorough audits indicate that Ukraine has handled the provided funds responsibly. Moreover, budgetary assistance was granted in the form of expense reimbursements based on receipts. This should be emphasized to prevent the formation of a negative image, which some try to impose, notes Professor Fedyk.
In her view, American citizens' attitudes toward Ukraine have not deteriorated, but many still do not fully understand the actual scale of aid provided to Ukraine. Americans continue to support Ukraine and consider their assistance important and beneficial. Therefore, it is crucial to spread truthful information to avoid misunderstandings, even when high-ranking officials fuel such misunderstandings.
Economists for Ukraine is a non-partisan economic think-tank, part of the AI for Good Foundation, a US 501(c)(3) Public Charity whose mission is to promote economic and community resilience. The Economists for Ukraine network includes more than 400 economists representing the world’s leading academic, scientific, and economic institutions.
Three years of war is, without exaggeration, a true struggle for all nations. Some are ready to stand side by side with Ukraine until victory, some have begun to momentarily doubt what to do next, and some have completely lost faith. Yet there are those who never cease to do good for the benefit of Ukraine and the entire free world. Thousands of Ukrainian and Polish women make invaluable contributions to the triumph of democracy every day. Despite the exhaustion of three years of war, they continue their relentless work for the sake of a brighter future. And we, the international magazine Sestry.eu, tell the stories of these incredible women who change the world for the better every day.
In 2024, the editorial team of Sestry.eu established a special award, «Portraits of sisterhood», to honour women who, through their active civic stance and willingness to sacrifice, do everything possible to help those who need it most.
This year, the award ceremony will take place on March 4th 2025 in Warsaw. The Honourable Chapter has selected 12 nominees. From these, the laureates of the «Portraits of sisterhood» award will be chosen - a Ukrainian and a Polish woman as the embodiment of close mutual support and cooperation in Polish-Ukrainian dialogue, as well as an example of true sisterhood.
Honourable committee of the «Portraits of sisterhood» award:
Dominika Kulczyk, entrepreneur, President of the Kulczyk Foundation
Agnieszka Holland, Polish film director
Kateryna Bodnar, wife of the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to the Republic of Poland
Natalka Panchenko, leader of «Euromaidan-Warsaw», chairperson of the Stand with Ukraine Foundation
Adriana Porowska, Minister for Civil Society Affairs
Myroslava Keryk, President of the Board of the «Ukrainian House» Foundation, Warsaw
Myroslava Gongadze, head of broadcasting for Voice of America in Eastern Europe
Bianka Zalewska, Polish journalist
Elwira Niewiera, Polish film director
Kateryna Glazkova, Executive Director of the Union of Ukrainian Entrepreneurs
Joanna Mosiej, Editor in Chief of Sestry.eu
Maria Górska, Editor in Chief of Sława TV
Nominees for the «Portraits of sisterhood» Award, Poland:
Agnieszka Zach, Polish volunteer
Photo: Agnieszka Rodowicz
Before the full-scale war in Ukraine, Agnieszka Zach worked as a guide in Poland’s largest nature reserve - Biebrza National Park. She was raising four children and building a house. On February 24th 2022, her life changed drastically. She decided to dedicate herself to helping Ukrainians. In one of her homes, she sheltered women with children fleeing the war. Later, she began travelling to Ukraine as a volunteer. For nearly three years, Agnieszka has been delivering humanitarian aid to the military on the frontlines. Regardless of the weather conditions, she walks barefoot - earning her the nicknames «Barefoot» or «Witch».
Anna Lazar, curator, art historian, translator
Photo: Private archive
Anna Lazar is a Polish curator, art historian, literary translator, and public figure who has been building cultural bridges between Poland and Ukraine for many years. She is a member of the Women’s Archive of the Institute of Literary Research of the Polish Academy of Sciences and the Polish section of AICA. She graduated in Ukrainian and Polish philology, as well as in art history, from the University of Warsaw. For seven years, she served as Deputy Director of the Polish Institute in Kyiv. In her interdisciplinary projects, Lazar combines contemporary art with historical and social reflection. Her translation portfolio includes both classical and modern works of Ukrainian literature.
Anna is also engaged in voluntary work. Her activities bring together artists, writers, and thinkers from both countries, broadening the context of Ukrainian culture.
Monika Andruszewska, war correspondent and volunteer
Photo: private archive
Polish war correspondent and volunteer Monika Andruszewska has lived in Ukraine since the Revolution of Dignity. In 2014, she joined volunteers travelling to eastern Ukraine. In her reports, she actively covered everything that was happening on the frontline. She witnessed combat operations in the Donetsk airport area. When the full-scale war began, Monika Andruszewska risked her life to evacuate 30 Ukrainians from under shelling in Irpin, near Kyiv.
Monika is now actively involved in voluntary work and, in collaboration with the Lemkin Centre (Warsaw), is collecting evidence of Russian war crimes in Ukraine. For her achievements, she has been awarded Poland’s Gold Cross of Merit, the Stand With Ukraine Awards, and the Polish Journalists Association award for her report «Bierz ciało, póki dają» (from Polish: «Take the body while they are still giving it»), dedicated to Ukrainian mothers searching for their sons who have gone missing in the war.
Anna Dąbrowska, president of the Homo Faber association
Photo: private archive
Anna Dąbrowska is the President of the Lublin-based Homo Faber association and Co-Chair of the Migration Consortium. She works on issues concerning the impact of migration on local communities and develops integration policies at the city level. She is also a co-founder of «Baobab» - a social meeting space for communities in Lublin.
Olga Piasecka-Nieć - psychologist, president of the «Kocham Dębniki» foundation
Photo: private archive
Founder and President of the «Kocham Dębniki» («I Love Dębniki») foundation. Today, the foundation supports over 1300 Ukrainian families. In February 2022, she put her life and career on hold to stand with Ukrainian women and families seeking refuge from the war in Poland.
Olga strives to help Ukrainian women and their children rebuild their shattered lives. She believes that the ability to turn crisis into strength and growth depends on a supportive environment and community: «What I actively aspire to achieve is for this experience to be passed on. And it is happening! Women returning to Ukraine take with them what they have learned here and incorporate it into their lives. They build new communities around them, using the knowledge they have gained here».
Anna Suśka-Jakubowska
Photo: private archive
Since 2013, Anna Jakubowska has worked at the Camillian Mission for Social Assistance, coordinating a project to prepare apartments for the homeless. Following the outbreak of the full-scale invasion, she was responsible for temporary accommodation for refugees at the social boarding house «Saint Lazarus» and helped refugee families settle into rented flats.
Nominees for the «Portraits of sisterhood» Award, Ukraine:
Yuliia «Taira» Paievska - servicewoman, paramedic
Photo: private archive
Yuliia Paievska, known by the callsign «Taira», provided medical aid to participants of the Revolution of Dignity. As the leader of the volunteer paramedic unit «Taira’s Angels», she conducted tactical medical training on the frontline from 2014 to 2018. On March 16th 2022, during the defence of Mariupol, she was captured by Russian forces and was released on June 17th 2022.
In 2023, Yuliia Paievska became a laureate of the International Women of Courage award. The US State Department honoured her with the title of «The World’s Bravest Woman». Additionally, she received an award at the «Invictus Games» in Germany. She has been decorated with the President of Ukraine’s distinction «For Humanitarian Participation in the Anti-Terrorist Operation» and the «People’s Hero of Ukraine» order. Currently, Taira has joined the 13th Brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine, «Khartia».
Olena Apchel - film director, servicewoman
Photo: private archive
Olena Apchel is a theatre scholar, director and volunteer. She actively participated in the Revolution of Dignity - both at the Kyiv and Kharkiv Maidans. From 2021 to 2022, she headed the social programmes department at Warsaw’s «Nowy Teatr». During this time, she became one of the active members of the Ukrainian volunteer community in Poland. In the Autumn of 2022, she moved to Berlin, where she worked as co-director of Theatertreffen, the largest theatre festival in the German-speaking world.
After three years abroad, Olena Apchel returned to Ukraine. In May 2024, she joined the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Mariana Mamonova - former Kremlin captive, psychotherapist, founder of a charity foundation
Photo: private archive
Mariana Mamonova joined the military in 2018, where she met her future husband, a National Guard service member. In the spring of 2022, the military medic was captured while three months pregnant. She was exchanged just three days before giving birth.
Following her release, Mamonova founded a charity foundation to assist women who have survived Russian captivity. Helping these women has become not just her job but her life's mission: «The goal of our foundation is to support women who have endured captivity. To help them rehabilitate - mentally, physically, and spiritually». The foundation also provides assistance to pregnant wives of service members, pregnant veterans, and pregnant women who have lost their husbands in the war.
Olga Rudnieva - CEO of Superhumans Center
Photo: private archive
Olga Rudnieva is the CEO and co-founder of the Superhumans Center, a clinic providing psychological assistance, prosthetics, reconstructive surgery, and rehabilitation for people affected by war. From the first days of the war, she led the largest logistics hub in Europe - HelpUkraine Center, created in partnership with Nova Poshta, Rozetka, and the TIS terminal.
From 2004 to August 2022, she served as the director of the Olena Pinchuk Foundation and was the coordinator of the sexual education space, Dialog Hub. She is also a co-founder of Veteran Hub, a centre providing comprehensive services for veterans.
Under Olga’s leadership, some of the most extensive media campaigns and charitable concerts have taken place, including performances by Elton John, Queen, and Paul McCartney. Over the past seven years, she has consistently been listed among Ukraine’s most successful women by NV and Ukrainska Pravda. In 2024, Olga was included in the BBC’s Top 100 Women of the Year.
Oleksandra Mezinova - director and founder of the «Sirius» animal shelter
Photo: private archive
Oleksandra Mezinova manages the «Sirius» shelter in Fedorivka, near Kyiv. Before the war, it was home to 3500 animals. Currently, the shelter houses just over 3200 - despite military personnel and volunteers constantly bringing in rescued cats, dogs, and other animals. Each month, the shelter takes in around 50 to 60 animals, many from frontline areas and combat zones. The shelter is involved in rescuing, treating, sterilising, and rehoming animals, as well as conducting educational and awareness-raising work. Additionally, «Sirius» supports low-income pet owners, mini-shelters, and their caretakers, who are often elderly people.
This year, the shelter marks its 25th anniversary. Over this time, more than 13 thousand animals have been rescued, with over 10 thousand finding loving homes. In 2023, «Sirius» received the honorary award «Choice of the Country». In 2022, its founder, Oleksandra Mezinova, was awarded the Order of Princess Olga.
Liudmyla Huseinova - human rights defender, head of the NGO «Numo, Sestry!»
Photo: Sasha Maslov
Since the beginning of the occupation, from 2014 to her arrest in 2019, Liudmyla Huseinova cared for children from a disbanded orphanage in the occupied Novoazovsk district. She brought them clothes, as well as Ukrainian books and postcards from free Ukrainian territory. She also assisted Ukrainian soldiers defending Mariupol at the time. She received a signed Ukrainian flag from them, which she managed to smuggle into the occupied territory and hide. The flag was not discovered during a search and remains hidden to this day.
Following her arrest in 2019, she was taken to «Isolation» and later transferred to the Donetsk detention centre. On October 17th 2022, Huseinova was released as part of a «women’s exchange». She now focuses on defending the rights of those affected by conflict-related sexual violence, former civilian prisoners, and supporting women who are still in captivity or under occupation. On 6 December, she founded and took leadership of the NGO «Numo, Sestry!», which unites women who have survived captivity, conflict-related sexual violence, torture, and other consequences of Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Partners of the «Portraits of sisterhood» award:
Ambasada Ukrainy w Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej
Patronat Honorowy Prezydenta Miasta Sopot
Kulczyk Foundation
Przemysław Krych
Ulatowski Family Foundation
Federacja Przedsiębiorców Polskich
Fundacja PKO BP
Foundation Kredo
Fundacja Edukacja dla Demokracji
Polsko-Amerykańska Fundacja Wolności
Wspieramy Ukrainę
Żabka
YES
Nova Post
TVP Info
Biełsat TV
PAP
Onet
Espreso TV
NV.ua
New Eastern Europe
СУП
We also encourage our readers to take part in the voting and choose the leader who deserves the special «Portraits of sisterhood» Readers' Award. To vote, simply follow this link. Voting will be open until February 22nd 2025.
The West had all the tools to foresee Russia's war against Ukraine - and chose to ignore them. Even before 2014, analysis reached NATO's highest offices: the annexation of Crimea, the threat to Mariupol, the Russian Federation's dominance in the Black Sea. The forecasts were accurate, but most member states opted for the illusion of partnership with the Kremlin.
Are changes still possible? What is required to achieve them? And can NATO remain an effective security alliance in a new era of threats? These and other questions were addressed in an interview with Sestry by Dr Stefanie Babst - one of the most influential security strategists in Europe, who worked at NATO for over 20 years, including as Head of the Strategic Foresight Team. Today, she is an independent analyst, the author of a book on the West's «blind spots» in its strategy toward Russia, and an active participant in international discussions on war, peace and security.
Ukraine, Russia and the strategic miscalculations of the West
Maryna Stepanenko: You led NATO's Strategic Foresight Team. How do you assess the West's ability to foresee Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine? Were there signals that were simply not heard, or perhaps deliberately ignored?
Stefanie Babst: There were many warnings that went unheeded. Allow me to explain. In international relations, it is crucial to accurately assess the mindset, capabilities and intentions of another actor. NATO failed to do this with Russia. As the Head of Strategic Foresight at the Alliance, I issued the first serious warning in 2013 - a few months before the annexation of Crimea. I presented an analysis outlining Russia's malicious intentions and its military preparations against Ukraine.
It was reviewed by the Secretary General and discussed with member states, but no action was taken
Some countries - the Baltic States and Poland - took the analysis seriously. Others - notably Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom - preferred to maintain the NATO-Russia partnership. From 2014 onwards, we intensified our analysis, forecasting actions such as the seizure of Mariupol, dominance in the Black Sea and the use of Donbas as a staging ground. These forecasts were presented at the highest levels, including the NATO Council, but were ultimately dismissed.
In 2015 and 2016, we broadened our focus to include China and its ties with Russia, offering future scenarios and forecasting so-called «black swans» - high-impact events that are hard to predict, seem unlikely but could have serious consequences if they occur. Again, many perceived this only as «intellectual exercises». Thus, NATO possessed the tools of foresight - and chose to ignore them. And that comes at a very high cost.
In your work, you call for a review of the West's strategy toward Russia. In your view, what «blind spots» remain in Western approaches - particularly regarding support for Ukraine?
Three years ago, I called for a powerful, multifaceted deterrence strategy to help Ukraine not just freeze the war but win it. I invoked George Kennan's Cold War approach, urging the use of all available instruments - economic, diplomatic and military - to push Russia out of Ukraine. But apart from some Baltic and Northern European countries, no one took this seriously.
NATO and the EU still lack a defined end goal. If Ukraine's victory were the objective, a corresponding strategy would have been developed
Instead, Western leaders underestimated Ukraine's resilience and failed to act decisively even after Russia crossed countless red lines. President Biden, despite his commitment to Ukraine, framed his approach around what the United States would not do: we will not provoke Russia, we will not give Ukrainians long-range weapons, we will not do this or that. This is not a strategy. Now, with Trump’s return, many European governments are passively hoping for a US-Russian agreement that merely freezes the war - something I believe is dangerous both for Ukraine and Europe.
My main criticism is the lack of political will in the West. Too many still see this as Russia's war against Ukrainians. But it is our war too
Stefanie, why do you think Europe failed to prepare effectively for Trump’s presidency?
Planning within NATO and European governments is often difficult, as politicians typically focus on short-term goals, usually only a month ahead. In times of emergency, particularly due to Washington's unpredictability, Europe must abandon crisis management mode and stop reacting to every event, such as a new tweet.
Europe must be firm with the United States, clearly communicating that their actions - including threats to countries like Canada and Denmark, withholding intelligence from Ukraine and halting cyber operations against Russia - are unacceptable. These decisions had deadly consequences, and member states should not be afraid to hold the United States accountable for violating the fundamental principles of the Washington Treaty.
Mark Rutte, the NATO Secretary General, recently visited Florida to meet President Trump, hoping to impress him with defence spending figures. He praised Trump’s leadership and even claimed that Trump had «broken the deadlock» in relations with Russia. However, this is detached from the reality of ongoing Russian attacks.
If the NATO Secretary General lacks a clear message, the best approach is silence, focusing on supporting member states and protecting them from any threat. We do not have time for empty words and political games.
Europeans must remain immune to American political theatre, focusing on strengthening defence capability and supporting Ukraine’s defence industry so it can resist Russian aggression
Rutte: NATO wants to make Ukraine a strong state. Photo: Office of the President of Ukraine
Migration and war
Germany is no longer the EU leader in asylum requests from South American and Middle Eastern refugees. At the same time, in the first quarter of 2025, applications from Ukrainians rose by 84 per cent. What does this indicate?
It is entirely understandable that many Ukrainians have chosen to leave their country for personal and professional reasons - this is natural, and no one should be blamed for it. But this migration has political consequences in Germany, particularly when far-right parties exploit it by portraying Ukrainian refugees as a burden on the social system, regardless of their skills or motivation. These sentiments are especially strong in eastern Germany, where parties like AfD and certain left-wing populist movements have gained support.
What concerns me is the lack of strong counteraction from the federal government in Berlin - clearer messaging and political leadership are needed
If more Ukrainians arrive, I hope the next government will take a positive stance, recognising that many of them can significantly contribute to the German workforce. This would mean reducing bureaucracy, accelerating integration and facilitating their employment. Whether this happens remains to be seen.
Continuing on this topic, in recent weeks, some districts in Germany have publicly declared that they can no longer accommodate Ukrainian refugees due to overburdened social systems. How do you assess these sentiments?
It is true that local communities across Germany still face difficulties in accommodating refugees - an issue that arose after Chancellor Merkel’s decision to open the borders, leading to a large influx of refugees from Syria, Afghanistan and other countries. Many municipalities remain overwhelmed by demands for housing, language training and integration support. However, Ukrainian refugees do not pose the same challenges.
Ukrainians generally integrate well, bring strong skills and education and do not contribute to social tensions
In contrast, some refugees from the Middle East struggle to adapt to liberal democratic norms, which fuels far-right narratives, particularly in eastern Germany. Parties like AfD and figures such as Sahra Wagenknecht exploit this, promoting anti-Ukrainian, pro-concession rhetoric that ignores the reality of Russian occupation.
Unfortunately, mainstream democratic parties are not doing enough to push them back. With growing support from American right-wing populists, such as those connected to Trump or Musk, this polarisation may deepen further, posing a serious threat to democratic cohesion in Europe.
Europe on the brink of war
Amid full-scale war in Ukraine, initiatives have emerged in Poland and Germany to prepare schoolchildren for emergencies. Does this indicate a deeper shift in Europe's security culture, where defence is no longer solely the army's responsibility, but that of the entire society?
Although some defence-related courses have begun in Germany, they remain insufficient, and the wider public remains largely unprepared - both mentally and physically - to play a defensive role.
Serious debates are now underway about reinstating military conscription, but surveys show that two-thirds of people aged 20 to 30 would refuse to serve, with many saying they would rather emigrate than defend the country.
This reflects a deeper issue: decades of political messaging have conditioned Germans to believe they live in peace, surrounded by allies, and need not prepare for conflict
As a result, Germany also lacks bunkers for emergencies, civil defence training and basic resilience measures for the population. Changing this mindset will require strong political leadership. Without it, the Bundeswehr will remain under-equipped and unable to contribute significantly to efforts such as a potential coalition in Ukraine.
We see civil defence becoming part of public policy, from educating children to testing alarm systems. Is Europe beginning to think seriously about its own resilience in the face of potential escalation beyond Ukraine?
Undoubtedly. Some countries, such as Finland, Sweden, Poland and the Baltic States, have prioritised both military capability and societal resilience in recent years. In cities such as Riga and Warsaw, the Russian threat is well understood. However, countries like Germany, Belgium, Portugal, France and others still view Russia’s war against Ukraine as a regional issue.
Fortunately, leaders such as Kaja Kallas are advocating for a long-term strategy against Russia. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, I have argued that we must prepare for a protracted conflict, as long as Putin’s regime remains in power, Russia will continue to pose a threat to Ukraine and the whole of Europe.
Strategic vision
Given your views on NATO's evolution and the need for a new coalition, potentially the so-called «coalition of the willing», how do you envisage its structure? What strategic or institutional frameworks will be important to effectively counter Russian aggression, considering internal challenges within NATO, particularly due to the influence of populist leaders, including Trump?
During my time at NATO, I was proud of my team’s ability to anticipate challenges before they emerged, especially regarding NATO’s enlargement. I was actively involved in the admission of new members, including the Baltic States, Slovenia and Slovakia.
One of the moments I had hoped to witness was seeing Ukraine’s flag at NATO headquarters, but I no longer believe that is a realistic goal
Instead, I believe Ukraine should focus on building a new coalition with like-minded countries, rather than pursuing NATO membership. The Alliance, particularly under the influence of destructive politics, is becoming increasingly divided.
If I were advising President Zelensky, I would recommend not wasting energy on NATO accession but rather focusing on strengthening a broader, more flexible alliance to counter Russian aggression. This would allow us to move beyond the status quo and prepare for the future.
Considering the current dynamics within NATO, how long do you think the Alliance can maintain its current structure before significant changes become inevitable? Do you have a timeframe in mind?
When President Trump was elected, I predicted he would undermine the rules-based order, and we are already seeing significant damage done to NATO, especially concerning the US commitments. European countries have started discussing enhancing the European pillar within NATO, planning to prepare for a potential US withdrawal within five to ten years. However, I believe that timeframe is overly optimistic - we may have only five to ten months before we witness new disruptions.
What lies ahead for NATO? Photo: BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI
Looking back, it is clear NATO missed the opportunity to prepare for these challenges. In 2016, I prepared a document for the Secretary General outlining potential harm Trump could cause, but it was dismissed at the time. The issues I raised remain relevant today, and NATO's bureaucracy is too risk-averse to plan for unforeseen scenarios.
If the Alliance fails to act, it risks becoming a reactive organisation that merely responds to Trump’s tweets instead of proactively working toward the future
I hope that countries such as France, the United Kingdom and Northern European states will cooperate with Ukraine to create a new joint alliance capable of better confronting future challenges.
Cover photo: MANDEL NGAN/AFP/East News
This project is co-financed by the Polish-American Freedom Foundation under the «Support Ukraine» programme, implemented by the Education for Democracy Foundation
Negotiations in Riyadh, agreements on navigation in the Black Sea, and now the White House's attempts to achieve a truce by April 20th - all these steps create the illusion of diplomatic progress. But is this truly a step towards peace or another political manoeuvre?
Russia, despite its promises, continues to attack Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. The West, meanwhile, is considering easing sanctions against the Russian agricultural sector, even though Moscow has made no concessions. All this is happening against the backdrop of the Trump administration’s attempts to use the war for its own geopolitical game.
Does the White House have a clear strategy, or is it merely an attempt to secure a «success» before Easter? Is diplomacy turning into a tool for weakening sanctions that ultimately benefits the Kremlin? This is the subject of an exclusive interview with John Bolton - American Republican politician, diplomat and former National Security Advisor to Donald Trump (2018-2019).
The negotiation process
Maryna Stepanenko: Last week, we saw another round of negotiations in Riyadh. How would you assess their progress?
John Bolton: Certain agreements were reached regarding a ceasefire in the Black Sea in terms of the conditions under which commercial vessels may freely cross the Black Sea without being attacked. Commercial vessels must not be used for military purposes. And I believe we have generally returned to what was being discussed with Turkey back in 2022.
This may be progress, but I believe Russia is as interested in this as Ukraine, so that they can transport part of their agricultural products. I do not believe this necessarily guarantees progress in ceasing hostilities on land or towards a more comprehensive ceasefire, let alone a final settlement.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio with National Security Advisor Mike Waltz and US Middle East Representative Steve Witkoff during negotiations in Saudi Arabia. Photo: Evelyn Hockstein/Associated Press/East News
We witnessed Russia breaking its promise to stop strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Moreover, the attacks have not only continued but intensified. Now we have agreements aimed at ensuring safe navigation in the Black Sea and preventing the use of commercial vessels for military purposes. How can the United States guarantee that Russia will honour any agreements, given its history of violating international commitments?
I do not believe any guarantees exist. That is precisely why President Zelenskyy is so adamant about security guarantees - he understands Russia’s track record all too well.
An agreement can be reached on almost anything, but a Russian signature will not prevent a third invasion if Moscow decides to launch it
Many of these errors were made in 2014, ultimately leading to Russia’s second invasion. But the damage has been done, and the idea that the simple signing of a document ensures lasting peace and stability is fundamentally flawed - especially if the agreement leaves certain territories in Russian hands, making it inherently inadequate.
The United States announced its intention to support the resumption of Russian exports of agricultural products and fertilisers, including by lowering maritime insurance costs and improving access to ports and payment systems. Does this not contradict existing sanctions policy, particularly given the lack of Russian concessions toward achieving real peace?
Yes, I believe this reflects a relaxation of sanctions that provides Russia with more economic opportunities than it previously had, without any clear justification. Ukraine has been relatively successful in exporting its agricultural products from Odesa via the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus.
I am not certain it will truly benefit from this agreement. It offers certain assurances that vessels will not become targets, but ultimately, the real beneficiary of the Black Sea deal may very well be Russia.
Does this initiative not set a precedent whereby Moscow can use diplomatic negotiations as a tool to ease sanctions without altering its aggressive policies?
Russia's short-term diplomatic strategy is quite clear: to lift as many restrictions and as much pressure as possible while continuing to wage war, particularly as they believe the battlefield dynamics favour them.
Their primary objective is to ease the economic pressure they are facing. Although this pressure has not been as severe as it could have been, it is still significant enough to prompt them to seek relief
The real question is why the United States should provide such relief if Russia is not changing its behaviour. If they are not making meaningful concessions on a ceasefire or demonstrating genuine intent to end the war, then there is no justification for reducing pressure. Thus far, they have shown no signs of doing either.
What will happen to shipping in the Black Sea? Photo: Ukrinform/East News
Peace by Easter
The White House is seeking to broker a ceasefire agreement by April 20th, which this year coincides with Easter for both Catholics and Orthodox Christians. In your opinion, does the Trump administration have a specific strategy for this?
No, I do not believe there is a specific strategy. At best, Trump has moved from claiming he could resolve the war in a single day to postponing the timeline to April. By Easter, there may be a declaration of progress so that he can claim success, but I would be very surprised if a comprehensive ceasefire were achieved by then.
As I see it, the Kremlin does not consider a ceasefire to be in its interests. They are willing to humour Trump because they have already secured major concessions from him on long-term matters - no full restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, no NATO membership and no NATO security guarantees. The Russians do not wish to risk losing these advantages. Therefore, while they may engage in negotiations, there is no real indication that they intend to alter their long-term objectives.
US Special Representative Steve Witkoff identified the greatest obstacle to resolving the war in Ukraine as the status of Crimea and the four regions of mainland Ukraine occupied by Russia, calling them the «elephant in the room» in peace negotiations. Are there realistic scenarios for reclaiming these territories? What diplomatic, military or economic instruments might support this aim?
I believe there are alternatives, but they will likely involve a protracted war. The key issue is whether Ukraine can continue to fight if the United States again suspends military assistance. That is the leverage Trump possesses.
As for Witkoff, I believe he is frequently influenced by Russian propaganda, and what you have just mentioned is a prime example of that
The four regions and Crimea were not some internal issue - they were the targets of unprovoked Russian aggression both in 2014 and 2022. If anything, they are Russia’s problem, not Ukraine’s.
US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz proposed the idea of beginning negotiations to freeze front lines «where they currently stand». What consequences might this have?
Well, I am very concerned. One of the main issues I have with a ceasefire is that if it is declared along the current lines of contact and negotiations begin in Geneva, Vienna or even Riyadh, that line of ceasefire could quickly become a de facto border.
The longer the negotiations drag on, the more Russia will work to consolidate its presence - establishing administrative structures, integrating the occupied territories into its governance system and treating them as though they are part of Russia.
Eventually, they will claim that returning these territories is impossible. That is why I believe a ceasefire in this context poses a serious risk for Ukraine
Trump and Putin - a reset in relations
Russia speaks frequently of resetting relations with the United States. Is this realistic? What are the long-term security implications for the United States and NATO of Trump's growing trust in Putin?
Putin manipulates Trump with remarkable ease, relying on his KGB training and clear understanding of Russia’s strategic interests. Unlike him, Trump appears not to recognise any significant American interests in this situation.
He is willing to abandon Ukraine’s position because it simply does not matter to him
Trump sees his relationship with Putin as personal, believing that if he gets along with the Russian leader, then US-Russian relations must be strong. But Putin does not view it that way. This overly simplistic and naive approach to foreign policy - where everything is reduced to personal dynamics - is precisely what Putin exploits to achieve his own goals at Ukraine’s expense.
Recently, Bild published a rather dramatic report suggesting that Russia might invade Lithuanian territory as early as this autumn. How realistic is this scenario?
From a military standpoint, Russia could attempt such an operation, perhaps to secure a corridor to the Kaliningrad exclave. However, I do not think it is likely. Putin is eyeing several other parts of the former Soviet Union - Central Asia, the Caucasus and Moldova - where he might see opportunities to reassert Russian control.
If a ceasefire were reached in Ukraine, I believe he would prioritise these regions over the far riskier step of a direct invasion of NATO territory
However, if Trump continues to weaken NATO, Putin may eventually decide the risk is worth taking.
How would a potential US retreat from active European engagement under Trump affect the regional balance of power, and could the EU compensate for this security vacuum?
I believe that a US withdrawal from NATO would be a catastrophic mistake for both the United States and Europe.
Even a significant weakening of the Alliance would have serious consequences. Putin understands this well
He knows Trump is only in office for four years, and he may see this as an opportunity. Encouraging Trump to take steps that weaken or even dismantle NATO could bring long-term benefits for Russia. But Putin also realises that this window will not last forever - he cannot count on more than four years. That is why he is trying to manipulate Trump, seeking through diplomacy and political influence to achieve what the Russian military has so far failed to accomplish in Ukraine.
Given the current tensions in relations between Canada and the US - something few could have predicted - do you believe Canada might strengthen its cooperation with Europe to form a NATO-like alliance without the United States, in order to enhance European security?
Canada may attempt to do so, but it would be a serious mistake - for Canada, for Europe and for all interested parties. If the United States withdraws from NATO or if Europe effectively pushes the United States out, it will be a major blunder. Despite the damage that Trump has already caused and may yet cause, we must take a long-term perspective. He has 46 months left in office, but security relations between Europe and the United States will endure for decades. During the Cold War, one of Russia’s key objectives was to divide the West, but it never succeeded.
We now risk doing this to ourselves. It is absolutely vital to avoid that
It will not be easy with Trump, but we must remain focused on the long-term objective.
Trump’s approval ratings and another scandal in his administration
Although Trump's approval rating is at a personal high, it still remains below the 50 per cent threshold, and a slight majority of voters (51 per cent) currently disapprove of his performance. How focused is the American public on the White House's policy regarding Ukraine? Is there potential for public pressure on Trump to continue military support for Kyiv?
I still believe that is possible. Trump's approval ratings are declining, but for years, people have noted that he has what is often referred to as a «high floor and low ceiling» - meaning his ratings tend to remain within a narrow range.
At the same time, although Trump is the newly elected president, he is also a «lame duck» president, as he cannot run for a third term. This means his approval ratings could fall even further during a second term than they did during the first.
It is unclear how events will unfold, but for now, his ratings are gradually declining. If tariff uncertainty continues to affect the economy, this trend may persist.
Mr Bolton, during Donald Trump's first term, you served as his National Security Advisor. What was your initial reaction when you learned about the scandal involving the addition of The Atlantic’s editor-in-chief Jeffrey Goldberg to a closed chat where the topic of a US military strike on Yemen was discussed? What does such a precedent signify?
It was truly shocking. I cannot imagine why anyone would even consider using an unsecured, non-government communication channel. Signal is unlikely to replace the highly secure network that the US government has spent vast sums to develop over many years. No one has offered a reasonable explanation for this - because, frankly, I do not believe one exists. This is a serious issue for the Trump administration. We shall have to wait and see whether it dissipates or not.
But one thing is clear - when high-ranking American officials act so recklessly, it only encourages America’s adversaries to intensify their espionage efforts
Donald Trump and John Bolton. Photo: Atlantic Council
During our conversation, you emphasised that Trump’s time in office is limited to four years and that he will eventually leave the White House. Do you believe JD Vance might be a contender to succeed him in the future? What would such a figure in the White House mean for America, the world and global security?
It is far from certain that he will even receive the Republican nomination. His chances will largely depend on how popular the Trump administration is two to two-and-a-half years from now. If the economy slips into recession due to tariffs, it will damage anyone associated with Trump's presidency.
Meanwhile, although the Democratic Party has shown little momentum in the four months since the election, it may field a strong candidate in 2028. There are no guarantees that Vance will win the nomination or become president.
Historically, only two vice presidents have been elected president immediately after their vice-presidential terms: George H. W. Bush in 1988 and, before him, Martin Van Buren in the early 19th century. It is a rare occurrence. Some vice presidents have won presidential elections later in their careers, but direct successors to the president they served with are extremely rare.
This project is co-financed by the Polish-American Freedom Foundation under the «Support Ukraine» programme, implemented by the Education for Democracy Foundation
A herald of apocalypse or a much-needed disruptor of the current world order? Donald Trump spent his first three weeks as US president in turbo mode. Dozens of decisions and executive orders, even more statements and extended interviews - he has dominated the global news space and is ready for decisive action.
The absolute priority of the new Administration is ending the war in Ukraine. Is a swift peace possible, and how long-lasting might it be? Senior fellow and adviser at the Centre for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), British writer and journalist Edward Lucas answered these and other questions in an exclusive interview with Sestry.
A spring truce
Maryna Stepanenko: According to The Independent, Donald Trump wants to end the war in Ukraine by spring. How realistic is such a plan?
Edward Lucas: I do not think even Trump himself seriously believes he can end the war by spring. He may be able to initiate some negotiations. Perhaps he will manage to alter the current parameters of the war, but he will not end it.
The US president has repeatedly stated that he will exert pressure on Moscow, including through sanctions, should the Kremlin refuse to negotiate. We can see that the first threat - lowering the price of oil - has already begun to materialise. Trump said that reducing prices would affect Putin’s ability to finance the war. How effective could this approach be, considering Russia’s ability to diversify its energy exports, for example, to China or India?
A collapse in oil prices is a good idea in terms of increasing economic pressure on Putin. However, I doubt that it will be a decisive factor. I think the Russian economy has demonstrated remarkable resilience, both in terms of physical endurance against Ukrainian attacks on infrastructure and in terms of its export stability, import substitution capability, and overall ability to cope with sanctions. Thus, I would be surprised if low oil prices forced Putin to the negotiating table in a weak position. Nevertheless, I still consider it a good move.
Do you believe that Trump’s «carrot-and-stick» strategy - combining pressure on Moscow with open offers of negotiations - could force Putin to make concessions?
It is possible if you have the right sticks and the right carrots, but I am not an optimist.
I believe there is a significant risk of wishful thinking. It is entirely possible that Putin will irritate Trump to such an extent that the latter will return to supporting Ukraine with all the necessary weaponry, apply real pressure on Russia, and deal the Kremlin a decisive defeat on the battlefield. We would all be delighted by this, but I think the chances of it happening are rather low.
It is more likely that America will huff and puff but will not fundamentally change the situation. I think it is quite probable that Trump will tell the Europeans: «If you are so concerned about Ukraine, then fix the situation yourselves». Meaning they will have to provide more money and weapons instead of coming to the United States expecting Washington to solve all their problems.
This fully aligns with Trump’s worldview. He needs one major deal in the coming months because he wants to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. And this could be a deal that at least temporarily halts Russia’s war against Ukraine
However, it could also be a deal between the Israelis and major Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia. Thus, he is searching for a large-scale agreement, but it does not necessarily have to involve Ukraine. And I believe that a peace deal concerning Ukraine will be much harder to achieve than one in the Middle East.
On February 9th, it became known that Trump spoke on the phone with Putin about the war in Ukraine. Photo: Ben Curtis/Associated Press/East News
So, if the new Administration fails to make progress in resolving the war in Ukraine in the coming months, what are the most likely scenarios? Could Washington lose interest?
If Trump does not consider European security important for America and believes that Europeans should handle it themselves, then Ukraine, as a key issue of European security, may fall out of his agenda.
Europeans will have to make considerable efforts to convince Trump of Europe’s importance, as he perceives it rather negatively and seeks to exert pressure for economic and business reasons
Could one imagine Trump addressing Congress to request another 100 billion dollars for Ukraine? It is not impossible, but it is unlikely. Therefore, large volumes of American aid for Ukraine this year seem unrealistic.
At the same time, Putin believes he has the advantage on the battlefield and that the West is losing unity. He sees a gradual decline in morale in Ukraine and is not inclined to negotiate. If he is convinced he can win by military means, why would he agree to talks?
Coincidentally, in Putin’s recent statements, we hear that Russia is supposedly ready for negotiations. The Russian president is also flattering Trump, speaking about his «good relations» with the current US president. What signals is Moscow thus sending to the White House?
I do not consider Putin an idiot. And he knows it is important not to offend Trump. Of course, he will say he is ready for negotiations.
However, I do not believe that Russia currently sees a need for serious negotiations. I suspect that Putin will sit at the negotiating table and say: «We want a demilitarised Ukraine. We want guarantees that you will never join NATO». And another two or three demands, including the incorporation of temporarily occupied territories into Russia.
Would Trump consider this unacceptable? Perhaps not. Would Ukrainians consider it unacceptable? Almost certainly. Would Europeans be willing to support Ukrainians in their continued resistance? Possibly. But I am not sure.
But I believe that this is the most likely scenario. From Ukraine’s perspective, we will see quite an unreasonable negotiating position from Putin. And this is not the same as the beginning of real negotiations
What can Ukraine do?
Trump has said he is ready to meet with Putin at any time. Is there a risk that Ukraine’s fate could be decided behind Kyiv’s back?
There is always a risk of another Yalta (referring to the Yalta Conference of 1945, when the leaders of the USA (Roosevelt), the UK (Churchill) and the USSR (Stalin) determined the post-war world order, effectively dividing Europe into spheres of influence, leading to Soviet control over Eastern Europe, - Edit.). Trump may want to humiliate Europe and declare that he has decided everything, forcing others to accept his deal.
To prevent this, Ukraine and Europe must act as one entity and clearly state that they will not accept an agreement between Trump and Putin
Even if the US steps aside, Ukraine must demonstrate that it will continue to fight. This alone will strengthen its negotiating position. However, there are two realities: diplomatic manoeuvres and the situation on the battlefield. What happens at the negotiating table depends on events at the front.
Ukraine is rightly asking its partners to guarantee its security to prevent another Russian attack should an agreement on a ceasefire be reached. Given the painful experience of the Budapest Memorandum, what should new guarantees for Ukraine look like, and what could ensure their real enforcement?
This is the key question: is a genuine truce possible, and how can Ukraine’s security and development be ensured? This requires strong military and security guarantees, but paper agreements do not work. NATO is not ready to accept Ukraine, and the deployment of 40-60 thousand troops to monitor the truce seems unrealistic.
An alternative could be providing Ukraine with high-tech weaponry - for example, Taurus or Tomahawk missiles. But is the West truly ready to allow Ukraine to use them at its own discretion? This is a major question.
My pessimistic forecast is that there will be a truce, but without reliable security. Russia will test these guarantees, they will prove weak, and the situation will eventually become even worse
The «Axis of Evil»
As soon as Trump concludes a peace agreement, a race between Russia and the West to prepare their armies for the next conflict will begin, - writes The Times, citing sources. Given the economic sanctions and the depletion of resources due to the prolonged war against Ukraine, will Russia be capable of competing with the West in modernising its armed forces? Could the Kremlin find support from a «new axis of aggressors» for this?
It is worth remembering that, ultimately, Russia has an economy comparable to or slightly smaller than Italy’s. And they have paid a terrible price for the first three years of the war. However, predictions of Russia’s economic collapse have turned out to be wishful thinking.
Putin still has many options, both in terms of economic resilience and mobilisation. And as long as Russians believe this is an existential struggle for their country’s future, they will endure pain and sacrifices. Moreover, I think Putin sees that the West is still very weak, and he now has a great opportunity to capitalise on military successes in Ukraine, advance further, and possibly return after a ceasefire to completely eradicate the remnants of Ukrainian resistance, taking advantage of these, I fear, weak security guarantees.
He also has an opportunity to toy with NATO and the weakness of the Alliance’s northeastern flank, particularly in the Baltic states, where we still lack proper defences. There are plans, but no adequate defence capabilities. This is a very tempting target.
And it is not difficult to imagine that by the end of this year or next - Putin could secure a massive victory in Ukraine and dismantle NATO, making the economic and other pains caused by such a victory worthwhile.
Could a scenario arise in which Trump pressures China to, in turn, influence Russia into signing a deal with Ukraine?
China has a unique ability both to pressure and support Russia. But is Beijing interested in US mediation, after which Trump would take all the credit? Perhaps, if Beijing secures its own benefits.
However, China has no experience in international diplomacy that would suggest an ability to broker major deals. It prefers when Western countries ask it to influence Russia - this gives Beijing additional leverage
Given the trade disputes between the US and China, it is unlikely that Xi Jinping will consider providing Trump with a geopolitical favour regarding Ukraine a priority.
Is there a tool for long-term containment of Russia?
The only long-term hope is the transformation of Russia from an empire into a peaceful state. If this happens, resolving other problems will become significantly easier. However, as long as Russia remains imperial, the threats will not disappear.
NATO is no longer an effective response - it is too large, slow, and divided. Coalitions of countries that understand the threat and are ready to contain Russia in different regions are needed. This process should have begun 10-15 years ago. Now we are late, and perhaps even too late.
NATO exercise STEADFAST DEFENDER-24. Photo: AA/ABACA/Abaca/East News
Do you believe that a coalition of willing countries could provide security guarantees for Ukraine? If NATO is not an option, could countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany and France collaborate by deploying their troops in Ukraine to prevent further Russian aggression?
A coalition of allies could theoretically deploy troops in Ukraine as a deterrent force, but what happens when the time comes to actually use it? Are the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Poland ready to go to war with Russia over an Odesa blockade or a new offensive?
It is doubtful. To make guarantees truly reliable, 100 thousand troops would be needed, similar to West Germany during the Cold War. Europe does not have such resources - even 50 or 10 thousand would be hard to find.
European allies and NATO simply lack the capacity to mobilise the massive forces necessary to defend Ukraine. They could protect Ukraine through modern weaponry.
Theoretically, nuclear weapons could be placed on the frontline in Ukraine as a guarantee
However, this is associated with enormous political challenges, and I am not sure they are ready for such a level of risk. Without sufficient strength and willingness to take risks, providing truly effective security guarantees is extremely difficult.
The future of Putin’s Russia
Russia propagates the narrative that its economy is immune to Western sanctions. The EU claims this is untrue. How do you assess the situation inside Russia? How much longer can Moscow sustain its war against Ukraine under current sanctions pressure?
We tend to engage in wishful thinking when speaking about Russia. It has managed to mobilise its resources, even at a tremendous cost to its own future. The economy is suffering serious blows, financial system problems are accumulating, including a rise in bad loans in the private sector. Yet, despite this, Russia continues to wage war.
We want it to collapse, so we are inclined to believe it is already happening. However, Russia continues to find ways to sustain the war: it receives drones from Iran, recruits troops from North Korea, and circumvents sanctions through China. Moreover, it still has unused resources.
Future generations of Russians will be forced to pay for Putin’s imperial ventures. But at the moment, Russia is not backed into a corner. It is likely to endure for at least another one or two years, and even if the situation becomes critical, the Kremlin will find ways to adapt.
Has the West exhausted its imagination regarding sanctions? Are there still powerful tools that have not yet been applied?
Of course. We have not even used all available options. The West is looking for sanctions that will strike Russia without causing pain to itself. That is why we restrict pipeline oil and gas imports but not liquefied natural gas. We block crude oil supplies but not petroleum products. As a result, sanctions create difficulties for Russia but also open up a business model for those who help circumvent them - from Russians to businessmen in Dubai.
I would impose strict secondary sanctions, particularly against the «shadow fleet», bankers, lawyers and accountants who facilitate the evasion of restrictions. For example, I would strip them of visa-free entry to the US, Europe, and Britain. If you are a lawyer or trader in Dubai engaged in sanction evasion schemes, then to travel to the West, you will now have to queue at consulates alongside students, nannies, and asylum seekers.
A comfortable life for such people must come to an end
There are still many possibilities, but political will is lacking. And Putin sees this. Ultimately, the West has grown tired, frightened, and distracted - and Ukraine is paying the price. This fills me with both sorrow and anger.
What might Russia’s economy look like in 5-10 years if international isolation continues?
In the long term, Russia is increasingly turning into a dependent vassal of China. Chinese companies are buying up assets for next to nothing, investing in strategic sectors, and Russia’s economy is becoming ever more oriented towards exports to China. Trade and investment ties between the countries are only strengthening. In the end, Russia risks becoming a raw material appendage of the Chinese Communist Party - hardly the future Putin promised his citizens.
Cover photo: Deposit/East News
The project is co-financed by the Polish-American Freedom Foundation under the «Support Ukraine» programme, implemented by the «Education for Democracy» Foundation
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