German Bundestag member Roderich Kiesewetter: «The reduction of German support for Ukraine is the consequence of a lack of priorities»

A herald of apocalypse or a much-needed disruptor of the current world order? Donald Trump spent his first three weeks as US president in turbo mode. Dozens of decisions and executive orders, even more statements and extended interviews - he has dominated the global news space and is ready for decisive action.

The absolute priority of the new Administration is ending the war in Ukraine. Is a swift peace possible, and how long-lasting might it be? Senior fellow and adviser at the Centre for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), British writer and journalist Edward Lucas answered these and other questions in an exclusive interview with Sestry.

A spring truce

Maryna Stepanenko: According to The Independent, Donald Trump wants to end the war in Ukraine by spring. How realistic is such a plan?

Edward Lucas: I do not think even Trump himself seriously believes he can end the war by spring. He may be able to initiate some negotiations. Perhaps he will manage to alter the current parameters of the war, but he will not end it.

The US president has repeatedly stated that he will exert pressure on Moscow, including through sanctions, should the Kremlin refuse to negotiate. We can see that the first threat - lowering the price of oil - has already begun to materialise. Trump said that reducing prices would affect Putin’s ability to finance the war. How effective could this approach be, considering Russia’s ability to diversify its energy exports, for example, to China or India?

A collapse in oil prices is a good idea in terms of increasing economic pressure on Putin. However, I doubt that it will be a decisive factor. I think the Russian economy has demonstrated remarkable resilience, both in terms of physical endurance against Ukrainian attacks on infrastructure and in terms of its export stability, import substitution capability, and overall ability to cope with sanctions. Thus, I would be surprised if low oil prices forced Putin to the negotiating table in a weak position. Nevertheless, I still consider it a good move.

Do you believe that Trump’s «carrot-and-stick» strategy - combining pressure on Moscow with open offers of negotiations - could force Putin to make concessions?

It is possible if you have the right sticks and the right carrots, but I am not an optimist.

I believe there is a significant risk of wishful thinking. It is entirely possible that Putin will irritate Trump to such an extent that the latter will return to supporting Ukraine with all the necessary weaponry, apply real pressure on Russia, and deal the Kremlin a decisive defeat on the battlefield. We would all be delighted by this, but I think the chances of it happening are rather low.

It is more likely that America will huff and puff but will not fundamentally change the situation. I think it is quite probable that Trump will tell the Europeans: «If you are so concerned about Ukraine, then fix the situation yourselves». Meaning they will have to provide more money and weapons instead of coming to the United States expecting Washington to solve all their problems.

This fully aligns with Trump’s worldview. He needs one major deal in the coming months because he wants to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. And this could be a deal that at least temporarily halts Russia’s war against Ukraine

However, it could also be a deal between the Israelis and major Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia. Thus, he is searching for a large-scale agreement, but it does not necessarily have to involve Ukraine. And I believe that a peace deal concerning Ukraine will be much harder to achieve than one in the Middle East.

So, if the new Administration fails to make progress in resolving the war in Ukraine in the coming months, what are the most likely scenarios? Could Washington lose interest? 

If Trump does not consider European security important for America and believes that Europeans should handle it themselves, then Ukraine, as a key issue of European security, may fall out of his agenda.

Europeans will have to make considerable efforts to convince Trump of Europe’s importance, as he perceives it rather negatively and seeks to exert pressure for economic and business reasons

Could one imagine Trump addressing Congress to request another 100 billion dollars for Ukraine? It is not impossible, but it is unlikely. Therefore, large volumes of American aid for Ukraine this year seem unrealistic. 

At the same time, Putin believes he has the advantage on the battlefield and that the West is losing unity. He sees a gradual decline in morale in Ukraine and is not inclined to negotiate. If he is convinced he can win by military means, why would he agree to talks? 

Coincidentally, in Putin’s recent statements, we hear that Russia is supposedly ready for negotiations. The Russian president is also flattering Trump, speaking about his «good relations» with the current US president. What signals is Moscow thus sending to the White House? 

I do not consider Putin an idiot. And he knows it is important not to offend Trump. Of course, he will say he is ready for negotiations. 

However, I do not believe that Russia currently sees a need for serious negotiations. I suspect that Putin will sit at the negotiating table and say: «We want a demilitarised Ukraine. We want guarantees that you will never join NATO». And another two or three demands, including the incorporation of temporarily occupied territories into Russia. 

Would Trump consider this unacceptable? Perhaps not. Would Ukrainians consider it unacceptable? Almost certainly. Would Europeans be willing to support Ukrainians in their continued resistance? Possibly. But I am not sure.

But I believe that this is the most likely scenario. From Ukraine’s perspective, we will see quite an unreasonable negotiating position from Putin. And this is not the same as the beginning of real negotiations

What can Ukraine do?

Trump has said he is ready to meet with Putin at any time. Is there a risk that Ukraine’s fate could be decided behind Kyiv’s back? 

There is always a risk of another Yalta (referring to the Yalta Conference of 1945, when the leaders of the USA (Roosevelt), the UK (Churchill) and the USSR (Stalin) determined the post-war world order, effectively dividing Europe into spheres of influence, leading to Soviet control over Eastern Europe, - Edit.). Trump may want to humiliate Europe and declare that he has decided everything, forcing others to accept his deal.

To prevent this, Ukraine and Europe must act as one entity and clearly state that they will not accept an agreement between Trump and Putin

Even if the US steps aside, Ukraine must demonstrate that it will continue to fight. This alone will strengthen its negotiating position. However, there are two realities: diplomatic manoeuvres and the situation on the battlefield. What happens at the negotiating table depends on events at the front. 

Ukraine is rightly asking its partners to guarantee its security to prevent another Russian attack should an agreement on a ceasefire be reached. Given the painful experience of the Budapest Memorandum, what should new guarantees for Ukraine look like, and what could ensure their real enforcement?

This is the key question: is a genuine truce possible, and how can Ukraine’s security and development be ensured? This requires strong military and security guarantees, but paper agreements do not work. NATO is not ready to accept Ukraine, and the deployment of 40-60 thousand troops to monitor the truce seems unrealistic. 

An alternative could be providing Ukraine with high-tech weaponry - for example, Taurus or Tomahawk missiles. But is the West truly ready to allow Ukraine to use them at its own discretion? This is a major question. 

My pessimistic forecast is that there will be a truce, but without reliable security. Russia will test these guarantees, they will prove weak, and the situation will eventually become even worse

The «Axis of Evil»

As soon as Trump concludes a peace agreement, a race between Russia and the West to prepare their armies for the next conflict will begin, - writes The Times, citing sources. Given the economic sanctions and the depletion of resources due to the prolonged war against Ukraine, will Russia be capable of competing with the West in modernising its armed forces? Could the Kremlin find support from a «new axis of aggressors» for this?

It is worth remembering that, ultimately, Russia has an economy comparable to or slightly smaller than Italy’s. And they have paid a terrible price for the first three years of the war. However, predictions of Russia’s economic collapse have turned out to be wishful thinking. 

Putin still has many options, both in terms of economic resilience and mobilisation. And as long as Russians believe this is an existential struggle for their country’s future, they will endure pain and sacrifices. Moreover, I think Putin sees that the West is still very weak, and he now has a great opportunity to capitalise on military successes in Ukraine, advance further, and possibly return after a ceasefire to completely eradicate the remnants of Ukrainian resistance, taking advantage of these, I fear, weak security guarantees.

He also has an opportunity to toy with NATO and the weakness of the Alliance’s northeastern flank, particularly in the Baltic states, where we still lack proper defences. There are plans, but no adequate defence capabilities. This is a very tempting target.

And it is not difficult to imagine that by the end of this year or next - Putin could secure a massive victory in Ukraine and dismantle NATO, making the economic and other pains caused by such a victory worthwhile.

Could a scenario arise in which Trump pressures China to, in turn, influence Russia into signing a deal with Ukraine?

China has a unique ability both to pressure and support Russia. But is Beijing interested in US mediation, after which Trump would take all the credit? Perhaps, if Beijing secures its own benefits.

However, China has no experience in international diplomacy that would suggest an ability to broker major deals. It prefers when Western countries ask it to influence Russia - this gives Beijing additional leverage

Given the trade disputes between the US and China, it is unlikely that Xi Jinping will consider providing Trump with a geopolitical favour regarding Ukraine a priority. 

Is there a tool for long-term containment of Russia? 

The only long-term hope is the transformation of Russia from an empire into a peaceful state. If this happens, resolving other problems will become significantly easier. However, as long as Russia remains imperial, the threats will not disappear.

NATO is no longer an effective response - it is too large, slow, and divided. Coalitions of countries that understand the threat and are ready to contain Russia in different regions are needed. This process should have begun 10-15 years ago. Now we are late, and perhaps even too late.

‍Do you believe that a coalition of willing countries could provide security guarantees for Ukraine? If NATO is not an option, could countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany and France collaborate by deploying their troops in Ukraine to prevent further Russian aggression? 

A coalition of allies could theoretically deploy troops in Ukraine as a deterrent force, but what happens when the time comes to actually use it? Are the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Poland ready to go to war with Russia over an Odesa blockade or a new offensive? 

It is doubtful. To make guarantees truly reliable, 100 thousand troops would be needed, similar to West Germany during the Cold War. Europe does not have such resources - even 50 or 10 thousand would be hard to find. 

European allies and NATO simply lack the capacity to mobilise the massive forces necessary to defend Ukraine. They could protect Ukraine through modern weaponry.

Theoretically, nuclear weapons could be placed on the frontline in Ukraine as a guarantee

However, this is associated with enormous political challenges, and I am not sure they are ready for such a level of risk. Without sufficient strength and willingness to take risks, providing truly effective security guarantees is extremely difficult. 

The future of Putin’s Russia

Russia propagates the narrative that its economy is immune to Western sanctions. The EU claims this is untrue. How do you assess the situation inside Russia? How much longer can Moscow sustain its war against Ukraine under current sanctions pressure? 

We tend to engage in wishful thinking when speaking about Russia. It has managed to mobilise its resources, even at a tremendous cost to its own future. The economy is suffering serious blows, financial system problems are accumulating, including a rise in bad loans in the private sector. Yet, despite this, Russia continues to wage war. 

We want it to collapse, so we are inclined to believe it is already happening. However, Russia continues to find ways to sustain the war: it receives drones from Iran, recruits troops from North Korea, and circumvents sanctions through China. Moreover, it still has unused resources. 

Future generations of Russians will be forced to pay for Putin’s imperial ventures. But at the moment, Russia is not backed into a corner. It is likely to endure for at least another one or two years, and even if the situation becomes critical, the Kremlin will find ways to adapt.

Has the West exhausted its imagination regarding sanctions? Are there still powerful tools that have not yet been applied? 

Of course. We have not even used all available options. The West is looking for sanctions that will strike Russia without causing pain to itself. That is why we restrict pipeline oil and gas imports but not liquefied natural gas. We block crude oil supplies but not petroleum products. As a result, sanctions create difficulties for Russia but also open up a business model for those who help circumvent them - from Russians to businessmen in Dubai. 

I would impose strict secondary sanctions, particularly against the «shadow fleet», bankers, lawyers and accountants who facilitate the evasion of restrictions. For example, I would strip them of visa-free entry to the US, Europe, and Britain. If you are a lawyer or trader in Dubai engaged in sanction evasion schemes, then to travel to the West, you will now have to queue at consulates alongside students, nannies, and asylum seekers.

A comfortable life for such people must come to an end

There are still many possibilities, but political will is lacking. And Putin sees this. Ultimately, the West has grown tired, frightened, and distracted - and Ukraine is paying the price. This fills me with both sorrow and anger. 

What might Russia’s economy look like in 5-10 years if international isolation continues? 

In the long term, Russia is increasingly turning into a dependent vassal of China. Chinese companies are buying up assets for next to nothing, investing in strategic sectors, and Russia’s economy is becoming ever more oriented towards exports to China. Trade and investment ties between the countries are only strengthening. In the end, Russia risks becoming a raw material appendage of the Chinese Communist Party - hardly the future Putin promised his citizens.

Cover photo: Deposit/East News 

The project is co-financed by the Polish-American Freedom Foundation under the «Support Ukraine» programme, implemented by the «Education for Democracy» Foundation

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In January, another group assembled by Russian special services was discovered in Poland. It attempted to influence Polish elections by spreading disinformation. However, Moscow exerts its influence over European countries not only through such tools. As a result, pro-Russian sentiments in Europe are strengthening, and far-right political parties are gaining increasingly strong positions.

German politician («Alliance 90/The Greens»), MEP (2004-2019) and Vice Chair of the Supervisory Board of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom, Rebecca Harms, gave an exclusive interview to Sestry, discussing the biggest challenges the EU faces due to Russia’s actions and whether Europe is doing enough to counter them.

Russia’s Influence in Europe

‍Maryna Stepanenko: In June, the EU banned European political parties, think tanks and other organisations from receiving funding from Russia. However, are there loopholes that still allow Moscow to extend its influence over European countries?

Rebecca Harms: We have a new example based on an investigation by German journalists and disinformation experts. We know that since November 2024, a systematic campaign against German politicians has been underway. It is linked to the Russian troll factory once run by the late Yevgeny Prigozhin. Investigators discovered that more than 100 fake websites had been created to conduct campaigns against Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck and Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, spreading grotesque and false information about them.

I believe something similar has been happening in most EU member states, ever since Russia decided to launch an information war and support anti-democratic and pro-Kremlin parties across the European Union

Russia is actively trying to influence countries such as Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova and Serbia through economic, political and military pressure. Why is it important for them to maintain a European orientation? How can Germany and the EU strengthen their support for these countries to achieve this goal?

We do not have a magic toolkit for these countries, but much depends on whether there is a critical mass of citizens and politicians within them who can resist. Take Armenia, for example. Pro-Kremlin and authoritarian leaders lost the elections, allowing Pashinyan and his government to come to power. This demonstrates a certain resilience, and the European Union should support it, including by keeping the prospect of Armenia’s EU membership open.

You also mentioned Moldova. Partly thanks to Ukraine’s efforts, it has not only gained the prospect of EU membership but will soon begin accession negotiations. In some cases, external support matters. However, in Georgia, challenges have increased following recent elections. Nevertheless, the European Union continues to use democratic and legal mechanisms to encourage Tbilisi to return to democratic governance.

The rise of far-right sentiments in many European countries is often accompanied by pro-Russian rhetoric. How seriously does this threaten European unity and what actions can effectively counter these trends?

The European Union cannot win this battle against Russia alone.

Resilience is needed, and at times - resistance both in EU member states and in countries under pressure. At the same time, the EU can provide crucial support

We see this happening now, as the EU increases its involvement in the Balkans, as well as in Georgia and Moldova. Unfortunately, in Georgia, the EU took too long to respond adequately to the shifting priorities of the ruling party, which is controlled by a Georgian oligarch. At the same time, President Salome Zourabichvili, whom I greatly respect, also took quite some time to take a clear stance against the government.

The EU has tools to ensure fair elections, monitor voting processes and respond to cases of election fraud. We also have mechanisms to promote media freedom, institutional independence and the rule of law. These tools are stronger within the EU, but citizens of countries under Russian pressure are increasingly recognising their importance.

Take Serbia, for example. We are now witnessing a powerful public reaction against deeply rooted corruption, which is directly linked to President Vučić and his closest circle.

Russian disinformation and elections

Early elections will soon take place in Germany. Have you noticed any further attempts at interference from Moscow, apart from the campaigns initiated by «trolls»? How do they occur?

Recent investigations confirm that Russian-controlled «bot farms» and influencers are actively spreading disinformation through social networks, using both state propaganda channels, such as Ruptly, and direct online manipulation. In addition, influential politicians promote pro-Russian narratives through media appearances. Some act voluntarily, so to speak, on a public basis, while others are likely financed by industrial empires linked to Putin.

The rhetoric of these individuals questions NATO and the EU. However, the full extent of their influence will only become clear over time

Two parties in Germany - the far-right AfD and the new party of Sahra Wagenknecht (The Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance, - Author) - openly promote Kremlin propaganda not only concerning Ukraine but also against Europe and democratic institutions. It remains unclear whether they receive direct funding from Russia or only indirect support. Meanwhile, within major parties such as the SPD and CDU, remnants of the old camp of «Putin-Verstehers» (a derogatory term for German politicians and experts who sympathise with Vladimir Putin and claim that Germans should understand his position, - Author) still argue that Russia is an important partner for Europe's stability and unity. This position is based on the outdated Russlandpolitik (Germany’s policy towards Russia, - Author), yet it still holds some influence.

Why do pro-Russian or openly anti-European candidates - such as Zoran Milanović in Croatia or Călin Georgescu in Romania - find support among the population? Is it linked to growing scepticism towards the EU or the influence of disinformation campaigns?

Through social networks and pro-Russian media, directly or indirectly supported by Russia, propagandists manage to convince people that the problems in their countries - from healthcare to migration - are the result of poor EU governance and insufficient patriotism from their governments. This is particularly evident in the case of migration. For example, it was the Russian Air Force, not just the Syrian regime, that caused the massive wave of refugees from Syria. The same is happening today with refugees from Ukraine. Russian propaganda manipulates this issue, ignoring the obvious fact: people are being forced to flee precisely because of Russian bombings.

It is astonishing how easy it is today, using uncontrolled media and social networks, to make people believe lies. Europe is facing a problem that is almost impossible to solve

These so-called «social media» are not social at all - they are a hub for spreading injustices and disinformation, which have devastating consequences. However, when they first emerged, the left-liberal camp saw them as a «promised land» of freedom and equality, so these political forces resisted any regulation.

Now, the same people are demanding stricter rules, but it is extremely difficult. Young people who, for instance, use TikTok, believe that restrictions threaten their freedom, although in reality, it is about banning blatantly foolish content. Previous attempts to establish rules for digital media failed due to the resistance of major internet companies. Now, we face one of the biggest challenges - to finally implement the necessary regulations.

Poland has long been and remains one of Ukraine’s key allies. What risks does potential Russian interference in the May elections in Poland pose, and how could it impact support for Ukraine in the region?

Not only is Poland as a whole crucial for Europe, but so is Donald Tusk specifically. As a former President of the European Council and an experienced leader, he is a clear target for Russian efforts to undermine stability. Additionally, Poland is one of Ukraine’s strongest supporters and a key advocate for strengthening the EU’s military capacity, making it a priority target for Russian interference.

However, the Polish people must know that their newly elected democratic government, formed through a complex but legitimate coalition, is well-prepared to withstand this pressure

EU energy blackmail

Ms Harms, how successful have the EU’s efforts been in reducing dependence on Russian energy resources?

Compared to 2022, dependence has decreased. At least, according to the latest data I have seen in Germany, the situation has stabilised. Yet, if we had acted more consistently regarding sanctions, the result would have been better and faster.

It outrages me that «Rosatom» has still not been sanctioned. This company was part of nuclear terror from the first days of the war: the attack on Chornobyl, assaults and occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, and now - strikes on energy infrastructure, which create enormous risks for nuclear power plants in Ukraine.

That is why every time I read positive articles about the nuclear industry in France, I am surprised that those who admire it do not mention its connection with «Rosatom». For instance, EDF, the French nuclear company, is one of its key clients, and the French energy sector remains significantly dependent on imports from Russia.

How can the European Union counter Viktor Orban’s blackmail, as he attempts to use the issue of Russian gas transit to weaken sanctions against Russia?

I believe that the European Union is capable of compensating for imports from Russia through other sources. Thus, this is a problem or a challenge that can only be resolved if Orban also wishes to resolve it. However, even Hungary can survive without Russian gas.

Ukraine’s EU membership disruption and the risks of prolonging the war

What mechanisms do you believe Russia is using to sabotage Ukraine’s European integration aspirations? Is the EU doing enough to stop these attempts?

At every event concerning Ukraine’s integration into the EU, I feel that this is the best decision I have ever witnessed. Although the EU opened its doors to Ukraine too late, it has finally happened - despite Russian aggression.

It was a bold decision both for Ukraine and for the European Union. We are now in the preparatory phase for opening the first stages of negotiations

Undoubtedly, Russian interference, disinformation and other problems exist. The European integration process is already complex. However, the war itself makes meeting the requirements even more difficult. Thus, we are facing a completely new integration process, and predicting its future is challenging.

We are now hearing many statements regarding the end of the war in Ukraine. Everyone is closely watching the actions of US President Donald Trump. While we do not yet have definite outcomes, in your opinion, what risks does a prolonged war in Ukraine pose to the economic, political and military stability of the European Union?

It is not only Trump who says it would be better if the war ended. In reality, those who have suffered, who have lost their families, homes and cities, understand far better why it is crucial for the war to end as soon as possible. They know this much better than Trump.

However, on the other hand, the conditions for a ceasefire or truce must be such that they guarantee Russia will not repeat its attack on Ukraine in the future. This is crucial both for the EU and for Ukraine

Everyone wants to move on to a period of recovery and reconstruction, but we are not there yet.

In Davos, President Zelensky stated that «Europe must establish itself as a strong, global and indispensable player». Can support for Ukraine be considered the key test for Europe as a global player?

Yes, I believe so. The European Union, particularly some leading states that stood in defence of Ukraine even before February 2022, has become a much stronger player in the field of defence and security. However, significant steps still need to be taken, and this has once again become evident after Trump took office.

It is disappointing to see that, despite all the discussions before his inauguration, Europe was not truly prepared for Trump’s return to power. Although the EU has made considerable efforts since 2022, it is still far from being able to fully protect the continent. NATO is the key player here, and Europe now needs to seriously invest in the North Atlantic Alliance and its own security and defence forces.

This is one of the most urgent issues, in my opinion. Unfortunately, if you look at the German election campaign, this issue has not been given enough attention. Even after nearly three years of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, many politicians still hesitate to discuss these critical matters with their voters.

Cover photo: IMAGO/Andreas Friedrichs/Imago Stock and People/East News

The project is co-financed by the Polish-American Freedom Foundation as part of the «Support Ukraine» programme, implemented by the «Education for Democracy» Foundation

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